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Bride-Burning: The "Elephant in the
Room" is Out of Control
Avnita Lakhani'
"...We talk about the weather. We talk about work.
We talk about everything else, except the elephant in the room.
There's an elephant in the room.
We all know it's there. We are thinking about the elephant as we talk together.
It is constantly on our minds. For, you see, it is a very large elephant.
It has hurt us all.... ,2
1. INTRODUCTION
We know it exists. We know thousands of women in India die every year
because of it. We know there is domestic legislation banning it. We know this
legislation is weak. We know there are international laws against human rights
violations. We also know they are not fully enforceable and binding on a sover-
eign state. We know it has historical, cultural, and societal roots. We know
these roots run deep even as they run crooked. We know there is an "elephant in
the room" and it is called "bride-burning"3 in India. We know this "elephant" is
large, pervasive, visible, pernicious, violent, and deadly. We know it is out of
1. This article is dedicated to those women in India who suffer in silence and to those who
work tirelessly to end the silence and give a voice and a solution to the problem of bride-burning.
Avnita Lakhani holds an LLM in International Dispute Resolution from the Straus Institute for
Dispute Resolution at the Pepperdine University School of Law in Malibu, California. Ms. Lakhani
welcomes your comments and may be reached via e-mail (avnita@msn.com). Ms. Lakhani would
like to thank all of the staff members at Pepperdine's Dispute Resolution Law Journal for their hard
work and dedication in publishing this issue. This article is concurrently published in Volume 4 -
Issue 1 (Spring 2005) of the Rutgers Conflict Resolution Law Journal."
2. Terry Kettering, The Elephant in the Room (poem), at
http://www.bartow.kl2.ga.us/psych/crisis/elephant.htm (last visited November 29, 2004), among
other places.
3. Namratha S. Ravikant, Dowry Deaths: Proposing a Standard for Implementation of
Domestic Legislation in Accordance with Human Rights Obligations, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 449,
456 (2000) (Bride-burning is currently defined as the practice of dousing a young bride with kero-
sene and setting her ablaze because of insufficient dowry. Because the sari she traditionally wears is
highly inflammable, the young bride burns to death in a violent way, leaving little evidence of foul
play.). Note that while I address bride-burning here, an equally violent practice is sati, where young
widows are expected to kill themselves at the funeral pyre of their dead husbands. The statistical
counts of young women who die of sati is not addressed here, but involve the same underlying
issues.
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control, but we seem powerless to stop it. In fact, we do not even want to be-
lieve that it exists. The question is why? Today, out-dated, mythological mis-
conceptions of women combined with the grossly manipulative practice of
dowry means that bride-burning is as rampant today as it was 2,500 years ago
and the Indian government and society implicitly sanction dowry murders by not
adequately prosecuting it. A reality check is sorely needed.
This article is an attempt to answer the question of why the practice of
bride-burning continues and propose alternative ways to not only look at the
problem, but also to define workable solutions. It is only via a thorough conflict
analysis of this complex issue that the world might rein in a problem that is
clearly out of control in this day and age.
Section II examines the origins of bride-burning, its continued practice, and
societal ramifications Section III analyzes some of the current and proposed
efforts in place for banning bride-burning and punishing those who illegally
engage in this disgusting practice.' Section IV provides a conflict analysis of
this issue in light of its continuing devastation upon women in India.6 Section V
is a discussion on alternate, creative ways to resolve the issue of bride-burning
in light of the conflict analysis.7 Finally, Section VI concludes with a call to
action for victims, advocates, lawmakers, the international community and most
explicitly, the perpetrators of this human rights crime, to put an end to a practice
which, five years from now, will easily qualify as genocide of the women of
India.8
II. THE ORIGINS AND RAMIFICATIONS OF BRIDE-BURNING - SEEING THE
ELEPHANT
A. A Day in the Life of an Indian Bride
"When Sunita Vir married in 1991, her father, Kalam Singh, spent over
$5,000 on her dowry, which consisted of cash, steel trunks, cupboards, a sewing
machine, kitchen utensils, and most importantly, a black-and-white television
set, a most coveted possession among India's lower-middle class families. Still,
the elaborate dowry was not enough for Sunita's new in-laws. Less than two
weeks after the marriage, Sunita's husband and in-laws began demanding more
dowry from Sunita's family, specifically in the form of a new refrigerator.
Sunita's parents could not provide the additional goods, having already acquired
a large amount of debt to supply the original dowry. With two other daughters
4. See infra notes 9-78 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 79-171 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 172-297 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 298-318 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 319-323 and accompanying text.
250
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to marry, they could do no more. Sunita's in-laws began beating her for her
failure to secure the requested goods. In 1993, less than two years after her
marriage, Sunita's father-in-law and brother-in-law held her down on a cot,
while her husband doused her with kerosene and set her alight. Sunita died in
the hospital, having suffered from burns over 96% of her body."9
This story is about your mother, sister, friend, wife, lover, child, neighbor,
stranger, and foe. It is not just another story about domestic violence. It is a
story about murder - intentional, deliberate, pre-meditated murder. And it is
happening in India at least seventeen times per day, every single day of the
year."° Sunita's suffering is like the journey of countless women in India and it
begins the day a girl is born into the Indian culture and ends, most often tragi-
cally, the day she dies... maybe." Sunita Vir was a tragic victim of bride-
burning, one form of dowry-related violence against women that persists in In-
dia today. 2
9. Meghana Shah, Rights Under Fire: The Inadequacy of International Human Rights
Instruments In Combating Dowry Murder in India, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 209 (1993)(citing Anita
Pratap, Killed by Greed and Oppression, TIME, Sept. 11, 1995, Vol. 146, No. 11, at
http://www.time.com/time/international/1995/95091 l/women.india.html (last visited November 29,
2004)).
10. Shah, supra note 9, at 210 (citing Indra Chopra, Marriage: A Retail Outlet (April 2003),
at http://indiatogether.org/2003/apr/wom-moddowry.htm (last visited November 29, 2004); See also
Amanda Hitchcock, Rising Number of Dowry Deaths in India (July 4, 2001), available at
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/jul200l/ind-j4.shtmi (last visited November 29, 2004) (gives
several typical accounts of dowry murder, discusses various statistics offered by both the Indian
government and NGOs in recent years, and maintains that while exact statistics are difficult to ob-
tain, the National Crimes Bureau of the Government of India had reported a 170% increase in dowry
deaths in the decade 1987-97); See generally Himendra Thakur, Are Our Sisters and Daughters for
Sale? (June 1999), available at http://www.indiatogether.org/wehost/nodowri/stats.htm (last visited
November 29, 2004) (stating that about 25,000 women are reported as victims of dowry deaths every
year, adding that these figures are much lower than the actual statistic due to underreporting).
11. Judith G. Greenberg, Criminalizing Dowry Deaths: The Indian Experience, 11 AM. U.J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 801, 822 (2003)(citing the ancient Indian Code of Manu which calls for
women to honor and obey their husbands. "The wife should subject herself to the authority of her
husband. She should never do anything that might displease him, whether he is alive or dead." Also
noting that according to religious text, a woman's religious life was devotion "at his feet."). The fact
that the girl dies does not necessarily relieve the family of further suffering because now they have
lost a daughter and they have lost their social caste connections. Furthermore, they may even con-
tinue to blame the daughter for this loss and thereby bring disgrace to the family name, according to
some religious beliefs.
12. Laurel Remers Pardee, The Dilemma of Dowry Deaths: Domestic Disgrace or Interna-
tional Human Rights Catastrophe?, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 491, 493-496 (1996)(discussing
forms of dowry violence and ways women in Indian society are socialized to accept these practices,
including bride-burning, sati, female-child murders, etc.). Bride-burning also exists in Pakistan and
3
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B. Origins of Bride-Burning
Bride-burning, the practice of dousing a new bride with kerosene and set-
ting her ablaze to die, is the most common form of dowry deaths.' 3 Dowry death
is commonly known as a bride's suicide or a bride's murder at the hands of her
husband and her in-laws soon after the marriage because the husband and in-
laws are not satisfied with the amount of the dowry and, in most cases, are un-
able to extort additional dowry. 4 Dowry is defined as "movable or immovable
property that the bride's father or guardian gives to the bridegroom, his parents,
or his relatives as a condition to the marriage, and often under duress, coercion,
or pressure."' 5 In addition, the dowry paid is usually commensurate with and
proportional to the bridegroom's class, socioeconomic status, physical appear-
ance, and education."
other countries. In addition, the practice is pervasive among second and third generation Indians and
Pakistanis who have re-settled in western countries, such as Great Britain. While the statistics con-
tained herein reflect only those victims in India, the actual numbers are yet to be statistically cata-
logued, but are known to be even more extensive.
13. Ravikant, supra note 3 at 456 (bride burning is the preferred form for several reasons.
Kerosene is inexpensive and readily available as a cooking oil in nearly every household. In addi-
tion, the burning takes place in the home and is not considered suspicious. Because the sari worn by
women of India is light and highly combustible, kerosene quickly bums through the sari, engulfing
the woman and killing her will little or no evidence. Burning also mask any pre-death torture that a
bride may have suffered at the hands of her husband or in-laws and is virtually unidentifiable during
post-mortem examinations. Therefore, there is usually insufficient evidence of murder and the chief
witness against the killer is dead. Finally, there is a low rate of survival for the bride such that even
a dying declaration is unattainable as a form of evidence of murder because of the proximity of the
husband and in-laws while the bride lies dying at a hospital.).
14. Ravikant, supra note 3 at 456 (citing Lori Heise, The Global War Against Women, WASH.
POST, Apr. 9, 1989 at B 1; See also, A.J.F.M. Kerhof, Suicide and Attempted Suicide: Causes of and
Treatments for Suicide, WORLD HEALTH, Mar. 1994, at 18, 19-20; Acts of Parliament (1986),
Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 43, 8 Sept. 1986 (codified in part as India Pen. Code §
304B (Basu, 1998)). This Act supplemented the Indian Penal Code to include a legal definition of
dowry death: "Where the death of a woman is caused by any bums or bodily injury or occurs other-
wise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon
before her death she was subjected to cruelty of harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband for, or in Connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry
death'...." India Pen. Code § 304B(l) (Basu, 1998)).
15. Anshu Nangia, Note, The Tragedy of Bride Burning in India: How Should the Law Ad-
dress It?, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 637 (1997). Dowry used to be referred to as "stridhan". Stridhan
included gifts given to the bride by her friends, relative, and family to assist the bride and the new-
lyweds in their new life together. Stridhan remained the property of the bride and was meant to
provide some basis of future financial security since women in India technically are now allowed to
own property or devise property upon death. However, the practice of stridhan gave way to the
current practice of dowry, thereby placing the bride in a dependent state economically and emotion-
ally.
16. Ravikant, supra note 3, at 458. The dowry does not take into account the same character-
istics of the bride and the value she might bring to the marriage.
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There are at least four prevailing views on the origins and persistence of the
contemporary practice of dowry that leads to bride-burning. These views are
important in setting the foundation for subsequent discussions on conflict analy-
sis and future resolution of this human rights crime. These views also shed
some light on why bride-burning continues today despite varied enacted domes-
tic legislation, international law protocols, and grass-roots movements to halt the
practice of dowry. 7 The most prevailing view relates to the perception and
socialization of women in a highly patriarchal society such as India." Even
before she is born, Indian mythology has already defined a woman's role in
society.'9 The myths consistently portray women as economically and emotion-
ally dependent on men as mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters.20 From the
moment she is born, a woman in India is considered a burden, an extra mouth to
feed.2' Because of the caste22 system and the very narrowly defined roles of men
and women, women are considered an economic liability.23 Men are considered
an asset to the family because they can perform manual labor, carry on the fam-
ily line, and are expected to care for their aging parents, thus providing eco-
nomic security to the family.24 On the other hand, women are conditioned from
birth to be subservient to their husbands. 25 The girl's family sees her as "eco-
nomic bondage" for whom they will have to give up their tremendous resources
and material wealth as dowry. 26 This scenario is further complicated by the fact
17. This section only highlights the main arguments for the existence of dowry practice and
bride-burning today. See infra notes 86-178 an accompanying text for a discussion on current and
proposed means of preventing bride-burning and the extent to which these methods have succeeded.
18. Nangia, supra note 15, at 646-49; Pardee, supra note 12, at 493-95.
19. Nangia, supra note 15, at 647.
20. Id.
21. Pardee, supra note 12, pg. 493.
22. Caste is "a system of social stratification more rigid than a class and characterized by
hereditary status, endogamy, and social barriers rigidly sanctioned by custom, law, or religion.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 348 (17t" ed. 1976). The caste system essen-
tially determined an individual's social status. The five primary castes, in order from highest to
lowest are: Brahnin, Kshatriya, Sudra, Vaisya, and Varna.
23. Pardee, supra note 12, at 493.
24. Ravikant, supra note 3, at 457.
25. Pardee, supra note 12, at 495.
26. Compare Pardee, supra note 12, at 494-495 (Pardee notes that a girl's parents know that
when "she is old enough to marry, her parents will have to amass large quantities of money to induce
her new family to take on the burden of her maintenance) with Nangia, supra note 15, at 646-647
(explains it slightly different in that the "daughter is seen as a special gift to be given away at the
time of the marriage"...and this reflects the family's sacred duty to society to give the girl-child to
another family for whom she will bear the valuable gift of a new generation."). Obviously, the
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that once a woman is married, society mandates obedience to her husband."
Therefore, any disobedience is quickly silenced because it brings disgrace to
both the bride and her family.28 Divorce is highly discouraged and women do
not accuse their husband of violence, even in the most dire circumstances.29
They will suffer in silence instead. Consequently, because of societal pressures,
relatives, friends, or neighbors will not come to the aid of an Indian bride if she
claims domestic abuse.3" Once she leaves her birth family's home, she is alone,
considered an outsider even in her new family, and a virtual slave.
3
'
A second predominant reason cited by scholars is the new-found consumer-
ism that has caused countries such as India to become greedy.32 This greed re-
sults in using dowry as a means to climb the social ladder, achieve economic
security, accumulate material wealth, and "keep up with the Johnses". 33 Be-
cause of consumer greed, the practice of dowry has spread to those communities
and classes who traditionally do not practice dowry.34 Today, dowry has spread
to all religious communities, including the Christian and Muslim communities in
India, as a means to attain material wealth. 35 Furthermore, the insidious nature
of consumer greed perpetuates the need to demand more dowry since the finan-
cial value of the dowry represents the social and economic status of both fami-
lies and the extent to which either family can co-exist in the same social circle
within India's caste system. 36  Unfortunately, because of patriarchal attitudes,
the bridegroom and his family have greater bargaining power and usually set the
dowry rates. Furthermore, the economic model used to calculate the dowry
takes into account the bridegroom's education and future earning potential while
the bride's education and earning potential are only relevant to her societal role
of being a better wife and mother.37 Consequently, the bridegroom's demand for
a dowry will normally exceed in direct proportion to the potential husband's
practice of dowry does not embody the reverence for the woman, her family, or societal goals be-
cause it is now seen as simply a business deal with the daughter being the object of the negotiations.
27. Pardee, supra note 12, at 495.
28. Id.
29. Pardee, supra note 12, at 494.
30. Id.
31. Pardee, supra note 12, at 494-495; Nangia, supra note 15, at 649 (noting that the "bride
feels duty-bound to preserve the marriage because of the huge expenditures incurred by the par-
ents.").
32. Pardee, supra note 12, at 498; Nangia, supra note 15, at 643-44; Ravikant, supra note 3,
at 460-461; Shah, supra note 9, at 214.
33. Pardee, supra note 12, at 498
34. Nangia, supra note 15, at 643; (citing source that dowry deaths are rampant in urban areas
and in North India, including Delhi, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal. Dowry deaths
also occur among North Indians who have settled in Assam, Nagaland, and Maharashtra, but do not
occur in states such as Arunachal, Goa, Manipur, Meghalaya, etc.).
35. Nangia, supra note 15, at 643-44.
36. Nangia, supra note 15, at 644.
37. /d.
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education and employment, thus surpassing, in most cases, the annual salary of a
typical Indian family man.38 The taste of wealth only wets the appetite for more,
leading to a continuous cycle of extortion for more dowry at the expense of the
hostage bride.39
A third, primarily historical reason was to prevent the spread of the Muslim
religion and to fight off Muslim invasions.4" During the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries, Hindu culture and religion came under the attack of Muslim
invasions.4 To protect Hindu culture and religious customs, Hindus held stead-
fast to their castes and agreed to inter-marry only within their castes and sub-
castes.42 However, due to poor economic conditions, parents of daughters began
to bid for bridegrooms in an effort to find a husband of sufficient economic and
social standing. 43 This gave way to the practice of dowry being a form of set-
tlement in marriage rather than a gift voluntarily given.44 The practice of dowry
spread further to the lower castes and marriage became a commercial, contrac-
tual arrangement as "Hindu traditions suffered a period of at least 333 years of
continuous anarchy during which survival was top priority ...,,4' The practice of
dowry resulted in the degeneration of old Vedic traditions and scriptures,46
which held men and women as equal in status, and today thrives on the insatia-
ble perception of material wealth as the means to survive.
Finally, scholars argue that the practice of dowry remains as a remnant of
British rule and India's experiences as a British colony.47 Before India was a
38. Nangia, supra note 15, at 643; Pardee, supra note 12, at 498; Ravikant, supra note 3, at
458-460 (noting that the dowry is usually proportional to the husband's class, socioeconomic status,
physical appearance, and education. In addition, the poorest family may spend nearly $3,000 for a
wedding (not including additional dowry), which is equivalent to nearly 10 years' worth of income
for an average worker.).
39. Pardee, supra note 12, at 498.
40. Nangia, supra note 15, at 642-43.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Nangia, supra note 15, at 643
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Pardee, supra note 12, at 495-96 (discussing the Vedic period, 2500 B.C to 1500 B.C,
when men and women held equal status. Women's status did not change until the Aryan period
began in 300 B.C. when the Brahmins (highest caste) created and solidified the social caste system.
At this point, women's freedom was curtailed as the Brahmin texts degraded women, subordinated
them to men, and relegated them to the status of 'unwanted progeny'.); See also Greenberg, supra
note 11, at 827-829 (discussing the relationship between Brahmin dowry practice and subsequent
reinforcement by British government while India was a British colony).
47. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 827.
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British colony, there were different forms of marriage." While the high castes
(e.g., Brahmins) engaged in the practice of dowry, other castes recognized mar-
riages with varied rituals, including one in which the groom gave gifts to the
bride and her family (bride price).4 9 Under British rule, the government rein-
forced the dowry form of marriage by discouraging other forms of marriage and
considered non-dowry marriages to be invalid."0 By the mid-twentieth century,
the various forms of Hindu marriage that existed were discredited, leaving only
the Brahmin form of marriage consisting of a dowry.5 Therefore, historically,
Indian women and particularly Indian brides have been slaves to an ancient sys-
tem of survival since 300 B.C., for over 2300 years now!52  Only now, it is a
matter of life or death only for these brides as they are held hostage to acts of
torture, degradation, humiliation, and extortion. If this does not shame the inter-
national consciousness of humanity, nothing will.
While it is likely that each of these theories have contributed to the existing
practice of dowry, thus resulting in the continuation of bride-burning, none of
these explanations are an excuse for the continued practice of bride-burning in
violation of domestic and international laws. 3 Statistically, bride burning is on
the rise', convictions of perpetrators are nearly non-existent,55 and the interna-
tional community closes its eyes while there is a slow, statistical gendercide 6 of
women, specifically Indian women, who are burned alive or tortured to death,
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 828-29. The British government had two main reasons for
taking such a course of action. First, they wanted to standardize marriages for purposes of adminis-
trative ease so as to distinguish between valid and invalid marriages. To do so, they hired the high-
caste Brahmins as Hindu "experts" for advice on traditional forms of marriage. The Brahmins
recommended only the most demanding forms of dowry marriage. Therefore, as a result of stan-
dardization, all other forms of marriage disappeared by the mid-twentieth century. Second, the
British government did not like the idea of the bride-price form of marriage because the gifts passed
from the groom to the bride's family because the perceived it as the groom purchasing a bride,
though they did not balk at the idea that dowry form could be considered as the sale of a bride. In
the end, dowry forms of marriage were considered valid and all other forms were summarily extin-
guished and discredited.
51. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 829.
52. The practice of dowry began during the Aryan period beginning in 300 B.C. and continues
today.
53. Pardee, supra note 12, at 501-09.
54. Pardee, supra note 12, at 500 n.57.
55. Id.
56. Prevent Genocide Worldwide available at
http://www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/officialtext-printerfriendly.htm (last visited on November
29, 2004); See Gendercide Watch, available at http://www.gendercide.org/what-is-gendercide.html
(definition of gendercide; relation to genocide; examples of gendercide, etc.); See also book at
http://www.gendercide.org/g-and-g.htm.
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everywhere, every single day at the rate of seventeen (17) women per day.57
Over the course of a 365-day per year calendar, the result is intentional, pre-
meditated murder of approximately 6,200 women per year on average!5"
C. Slow, Statistical Gendercide of Indian Women
Bride-burnings qualify as genocide under international law.59 In addition,
bride-burnings can also be considered 'gendercide' as gender-based mass kill-
ings. 6° Under Article H of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Genocide, genocide is defined as "...any of the following acts commit-
ted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or reli-
gious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."
61
Analogous to genocide, gendercide is essentially gender-selective mass killing.
The term was first defined by Mary Ann Walker as "...the deliberate exteriina-
tion of persons of a particular sex (or gender)... a sex-neutral term, in that the
victims may be either male or female. 62 In this case, the victims of bride-
burning are innocent, young females.
57. Nangia, supra note 15, at 638, n.8 (citing the 1995 National Crimes Bureau of India statis-
tics).
58. Note - this number does not even account for the number of suicides as a result of dowry
violence or extortion. This number does not take into account intentional female infanticide or
female feticide because of the fear of dowry and the perception of women in India. These numbers
do not take into account such practices in over 5 other countries which practice dowry marriages and
result in bride-burning, female infanticide, and female feticide.
59. Prevent Genocide Worldwide, available at
http://www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/officialtext-printerfriendly.htm (last visited on November
29, 2004)
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Gendercide Watch, "What is Gendercide?" available at
http://www.gendercide.org/what-is-gendercide.html (citing definition as first noted in MARY ANNE
WARREN, GENDERCIDE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEX SELECTION (1995). Warren draws an analogy to
the formal definition of genocide and expands it to include gender and sex as the basis of genocide
under international law and also calls attention to the fact that "[t]he term also calls attention to the
fact that gender roles have often had lethal consequences, and that these are in important respects
analogous to the lethal consequences of racial, religious, and class prejudice.").
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The statistics on bride-burning, an arguable form of gendercide, are appall-
ing and on the rise. For instance, India gained its independence in 1947.63 Be-
tween 1947 and 1990, approximately 72,000 young brides between the ages of
15-20 years old were burned to death', an average of 1,674 murders65 per year.
Between 1990 and 1998 alone, more than 20,000 women were killed,' an aver-
age of 2,500 murders per year. In 1995, the Indian government reported that an
estimated 6,500 women per year die as a result of dowry-related deaths. 67 How-
ever, this statistic is contradicted by other, unofficial statistics, which state the
figure at approximately 25,000 women per year being murdered as a result of
dowry related deaths.68
Ironically, the rate of bride-burnings and other dowry deaths increased after
the Indian government enacted the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, with later
amendments in 1984 and 1986 to increase its effectiveness. 69 Furthermore, do-
mestic violence became punishable by law only in 1983.70 Even with these do-
mestic legislation "protections", bride-burning continued in ever-escalating
numbers and has reached epidemic proportions today, causing widespread socie-
tal, legal, economic, and cultural degeneration. The widespread, statistical im-
pact of bride-burning and dowry-related deaths is a systematic, intentional gen-
63. Andrea Krugman, Note, Being Female Can Be Fatal: An Examination of India's Ban on
Pre-Natal Gender Testing, 6 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 215, 224 (1998).
64. Id.
65. The turn "murder" is used here intentionally to indicate the gravity of the manner in which
the bride dies. See generally, Amanda Hitchcock, Rising Number of Dowry Deaths in India, World
Socialist Website, July 4, 2001, available at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/jul2O0l/ind-
j04.shtml (last visited November 29, 2004)(Even though investigations by Indian police have, in
nearly all instances, found that the bride's death was a "kitchen-accident", the statistics tell otherwise
in terms of the coincidence between "kitchen-accidents" and death of a daughter in law. For exam-
ple, "[o]f the 1,133 cases of 'unnatural deaths' of women in Bangalore in 1997, only 157 were
treated as murder while 546 were categorised as 'suicides' and 430 as 'accidents."' But as Vimo-
chana activist V. Gowramma explained: "We found that of 550 cases reported between January and
September 1997, 71 percent were closed as 'kitchen/cooking accidents' and 'stove-bursts' after
investigations under section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedures." The fact that a large propor-
tion of the victims were daughters-in-law was either ignored or treated as a coincidence by police.").
66. Krugman, supra note 63, at 224.
67. Amanda Hitchcock, "Rising Number of Dowry Deaths in India", World Socialist Website,
July 4, 2001, available at http://www.wsws.orglarticles/2001/jul2OOl/ind-jO4.shtm (last visited
November 29, 2004); See also Shravanti Reddy, Digital Freedom Network, "Ancient practice of
dowry perpetuates violence against women in India", ASIA OBSERVER, November 7, 2002, available
at http://www.asiaobserver.com/India-story2.htm (last visited November 29, 2004).
68. Himendra Thakur, "Are our sisters and daughters for sale?", Indiatogether.org, June
1999, available at http://www.indiatogether.org/wehost/nodowri/stats.htm (last visited November
29, 2004).
69. Pardee, supra note 12, at 500; See also Greenberg, supra note 11, at 808(citing the in-
creasing statistics of dowry deaths after enactment of the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 and later
amendments.).
70. Hitchcock, supra note 67.
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dercide of young women, unborn as well as those born to a fate they cannot
control.7' Twelve million girls are born every year in India.7" Of this number,
1.5 million girls will never reach their first birthday.73 Another 850,000 girls
will never see their fifth birthday.7 4 By the age of fifteen (15), only nine (9)
million girls will have survived childhood.75 At the same time, there will have
been an excess of twenty-three (23) million males in the country.76 One of the
most shocking, unbearable consequences is the result of one study which found
that, in 1991, there were approximately thirty-one (31) million more males than
females in India.77 The societal ramifications of these statistics are grave and
continued bride-burning because of dowry will lead a young, independent coun-
try quickly into the throws of major international human rights violations and
domestic civil unrest.
7 8
71. Krugman, supra note 63, at 218-220(discussing the impact of dowry on gender discrimi-
nation against women. Dowry practice is the major cause of the prevalence of gender discrimination
in India. The ramifications of gender discrimination has escalated from burning brides to keeping
women from even being born so the families do not have to carry the economic weight of a future
dowry for their daughter. Female infanticide, foeticide, suicides, and abnormally high male-to-
female ratios are rampant issues with underpinnings in the practice of dowry.); See Case Study:
Female Infanticide, Gendercide Watch, available at
http://www.gendercide.org/case-infanticide.html (last visited November 29, 2004)(quoting Marina
Porras, "Female Infanticide and Foeticide".); See also Krugman, supra note 63, at 229 (arguing that
a "high sex ratio society" would result in even more devastating results for women for several rea-
sons: 1) women would only be valued for reproductive capabilities and therefore continue to be
used as objects or commodities; 2) gender discrimination would continue to escalate and women
would not gain political power or economic resources; 3) oppression and violence generally in-
creases in a male-dominated societies and 4) the shortage of women may result in men stealing girls
from poorer villages to be married of or, worse, taking by force what they legally cannot get via a
dowry).
72. Krugman, supra note 63, at 218.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. It could be argued that the conflict between India and Pakistan is attributed in part to the
lack of the female, nurturing influence and the complete disregard of the role of women in a society
as nurturers, educators, and peacemakers. The male ego and aggressiveness plays itself out in dan-
gerous ways such as turf battles over Kashmir and nuclear proliferation and political power plays.
259
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III. CURRENT AND PROPOSED EFFORTS TO STOP BRIDE-BURNING -
TALKING ABOUT CONTROLLING THE ELEPHANT
Currently there are several domestic initiatives in place to criminalize the
practice of dowry and to punish those involved in bride-burning.79 In addition,
there are grass roots initiatives to prevent bride-burning8 ° as well as international
laws against violations of human rights.8 Finally, there are proposed initiatives
to stop bride-burning through a combination of amendments to existing domes-
tic law and broadening the scope of coverage under existing international law.82
Unfortunately, each of these initiatives has failed to effectively curb the increase
in escalated violence toward Indian brides and female children. The effective-
ness of each of the major initiatives is the focus of the next section, followed by
an analysis of the actual conflict and whether these initiatives are appropriate
given the nature of the conflict.
A. Indian Domestic Laws to Control Bride-Burning - Lax Enforcement/No
Remedies
The first major domestic legislation to halt dowry murders was the Dowry
Prohibition Act and its subsequent amendments. In 1961, the government of
India ("government") enacted the Dowry Prohibition Act ("Act").83 The Act
was amended in 1984 and 1986 to "rectify several inherent weaknesses and
loopholes..."' The 1986 amendment of the Act, also known as section 304B of
the Indian Penal Code ("IPC"), makes it a criminal offense caused by the hus-
band or his relatives if a "woman dies of bums or bodily injury or unnatural
circumstances within seven years of the marriage and where there is evidence
that she suffered cruelty and harassment in connection with dowry."85 There are
five major problems with this law.
First, there is ambiguity in the definitions of "dowry" and "cruelty".86 Un-
der the Act, "dowry" is defined as "[a]ny property or valuable security given or
79. See infra notes 80-107 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 1 13-150 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 151-171 and accompanying text.
83. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 807 (discussing how the modem women's movement of the
late 1960s and early 1970s as well as lobbying efforts by women's groups led to two pieces of legis-
lation intended to combat dowry violence, including the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961. The 1961
version prohibited dowry and the demand for dowry.); See also Nangia, supra note 22, at 652-
653(discussing India's legislative response to dowry-related violence.).
84. Nangia, supra note 15, at 653.
85. Id.
86. Id.
260
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agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- (a) by one party to a marriage to
the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage
or by any other person to either party to the marriage to any other party, at or
before or anytime after the marriage in connection with the marriage... ' 87
While the definition of "dowry" is more comprehensive, it does not take into
account unwritten transactions to exchange property, what property 'in connec-
tion with the marriage' is considered dowry, and the near limitless demand for
dowry that happens not only immediately after the marriage, but continues over
the course of the marriage in the form of extortion. 88 In effect, perpetrators sim-
ply find 'loopholes' and change the way they demand dowry.89
Second, there is an extensive evidentiary burden for the prosecution in
terms of linking "dowry" with the ultimate "cruelty" and "death".9" To correct
the problem of proof, the 1983 amendment of the Act created section 1 13A into
the Indian Evidence Act.9 Section 113A creates a presumption of "abetting
suicide by a married woman if the suicide occurs within seven years from the
date of her marriage and if the husband or his relatives had subjected her to cru-
elty."92 In addition, the 1986 amendment of the Act introduced section 113B
into the Indian Evidence Act.93 Section 113B establishes a presumption of guilt
that the husband and in-laws committed the dowry murder if "the woman was
subjected to harassment in connection with dowry before her death."'  How-
ever, these amendments still create further evidentiary issues in establishing a
clear link between dowry and suicide or harassment.
95
Third, the "seven year" statute of limitations in sections 11 3A and 11 3B are
inherently problematic.96 Perpetrators can simply wait until after seven years to
burn their bride or to cause the death of the young bride through ever-increasing
dowry demands, resulting in bride-suicide.97
87. Id. at 656.
88. Id. at 657-60.
89. Id. at 658 (discussing the Delhi study which indicates that in sixty percent of cases, the
husbands and in-laws did not demand a dowry until after the marriage, thereby falling out of scope
with the Dowry Prohibition Act. Another method is the exchange of 'gifts', which are not considered
under the purview of the Dowry Prohibition Act).
90. Id. at 653.
91. Id. at 654.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 654-55.
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Fourth, the Indian government amended the Code of Criminal Procedure to
require police to do a formal investigation if a woman has died under suspicious
circumstances within seven years of marriage.9" Again, this amendment to In-
dian positive law has failed to curb dowry murders because most bride-burnings
are considered "kitchen accidents" or suicides.99 Furthermore, police do not
conduct a proper investigation, prosecutors seldom file charges and judges
rarely hand down convictions.'°°
A fifth major, underlying problem with India's positive laws in controlling
bride burning is Indian society's misguided conviction that women should ex-
pect abuse and endure it.'0 ' The whole system of dowry has its basis on the
concept that men own their wives." 2 Therefore, this philosophy extends to the
more insidious view in which "brides can be viewed as objects to be passed
from one social group to another, both as a means for the procreation of children
and as vehicles for aspirations to social prestige."' 3
A second major Indian positive law is the 1983 "Anti-Cruelty" statute, codi-
fied as section 498A of the Indian Penal Code."' This statute prohibits cruelty
towards a wife and subjects the husband and in-laws to fines or imprisonment if
they subject the wife to cruelty." 5 Cruelty is defined as "either willful conduct
likely to drive a woman to suicide or to cause her grave injury, or as harassment
based on dowry demands.""' Unfortunately, this statute suffers from the same
degree of ambiguity as the Dowry Prohibition Act and a similar lack of adequate
enforcement to curtail bride-burnings and dowry murders.'0 7 In the final analy-
sis, India's positive laws have done little to address the issue of bride-burning.
B. Grass Roots Initiatives to Halt Bride-Burning - Cultural and Legal Road-
blocks
Because of the lack of adequate enforcement of existing domestic legisla-
tion, several grass-roots organizations have taken up the cause to halt bride-
98. Pardee, supra note 12, at 501.
99. Id. at 105; Ravikant, supra note 3, at 456 (discussing the fact that because bride burnings
usually take place in the home without non-family witnesses available, it is difficult to disprove the
husband's or in-law's 'logical' explanation of a kitchen accident or suicide.).
100. Pardee, supra note 12, at 502.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 502, fn.89.
104. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 807.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 808-09 (citing statistics of a rise in cases involving cruelty to wives from 21,916
reported cases in 1993 to 36,432 cases in 1997. However, in another study of 737 cases registered
under the Anti-Cruelty statute in the 1990s, only 2.2% resulted in convictions, over 55% resulted in
acquittals, and 25% were withdrawn.).
14
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol5/iss2/3
[Vol. 5: 2, 2005]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
burning. One of the grass-roots initiatives is the government-funded family
counseling center cells.' The cells are usually located in or near police stations
with the intended goal of dealing with domestic violence, strengthening family
ties, and reducing legal intervention."0 While the intentions of these cells are to
strengthen family ties, they unfortunately reinforce and reframe the issue in term
of 'women's sharp tongues' and the men's tendency to 'hit and beat' as a re-
sult."' Some staff members also do not see a problem with male dominance and
control over women." Rather, the problem is reframed as one of women ad-
justing to newly married life rather than a problem of control and subordination
of wives or as genuine issues of domestic violence. This attitude simply rein-
forces cultural and legal perceptions of women and wives as objects.
2
C. Human Rights Violations under International Law - Lack of Binding En-
forcement
The issue of bride-burning and other dowry-related deaths has reached the
stage of endemic international human rights violations. Nearly every govern-
ment legislation, government initiative, and grass-roots organization has failed
to adequately address bride-burning and its more insidious, underlying problems
of female infanticide, feticide of unborn females, and suicides by young brides
and young women whose only fate lies in being a potential future victim. As a
result, activists for these victim-brides and critics of the current state of govern-
ment non-intervention are seeking redress through international law, specifically
under the International Bill of Rights." 3 These activists argue that India and the
108. Id. at 812.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at812-13.
112. Id. at 811-12. Because divorce is looked down-upon in Indian society and family har-
mony and social status is paramount, family, in-laws, friends, and even neighbors will not readily
come to the aid of a wife who is experiencing domestic violence.
113. Cf. Pardee, supra note 12, at 504 (citing that the following are three international instru-
ments that comprise the International Bill of Rights: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights) with Shah, supra note 9, at 218 (citing four international law
instruments that comprise the core of rights that are allowed girls and women from the time of con-
ception: 1) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); 2) the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); 3) the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); and 4) the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC)).
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Indian government are state actors, complicit in the continuing deaths of thou-
sands of women and young brides every year due to lax enforcement of the law,
near non-existent prosecution and punishment of perpetrators, and by condoning
cultural practices, such as dowry, that are precursors to human rights violations
against these women." 4
Currently, India is party to the following international human rights instru-
ments: 1) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)"5 ;
2) the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)' 16; 3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CEDAW) .; and 4) the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC). "8 In addition, scholars argue that India is also bound by the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as well as the Declaration for the
Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) because both are arguably
customary international law. 119
While India is a party to these instruments and has ratified 2 ° these interna-
tional human rights instruments,' 2 ' the government has either made reserva-
114. Pardee, supra note 12, at 501-03; Shah, supra note 9, at 215-17.
115. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A Res. 2200A(XXI), U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/htm/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm (last visited November 29, 2004) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
116. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A Res.
2200A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu31b/a-cescr.htm (last visited November 29, 2004) [hereinafter
ICESCRI.
117. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A
Res. 34/180, U.N GAOR, Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N Doc. A/34/46 (1979), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw (last visited November 29, 2004) [hereinafter
CEDAW].
118. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex 44, U.N GAOR,
Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N Doc. A/44/49 (1989), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/k2crc.htm (last visited November 29, 2004) [hereinafter
CRCI.
119. Pardee, supra note 12, at 504 (stating Professor L. Sohn's view that "...the Declaration, as
an authoritative listing of human rights, has become a basic component of international customary
law, binding on all states, not only on members of the United Nations..."); Declaration on the Elimi-
nation of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N Doc.
A/48/49(1993), available at http:// wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/instree/e4devw.htm (last visited No-
vember 29, 2004) [hereinafter DEVAW]; Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human
Rights, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm (last visited November 29, 2004) (the Inter-
national Bill of Rights is composed of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the
ICCPR and the ICESCR.).
120. Under Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "ratification" is defined
as "...in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the international
plane its consent to be bound by a treaty," available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm
(last visited on November 29, 2004).
264
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tions122 to the treaties and/or has not, to date, ratified key optional protocols.
23
The optional protocols, in particular, would give individuals and non-
governmental organizations a right of action to file a complaint and seek redress
for human rights violations at the international level. This appalling lack of
effective legal control over nearly fifty (50) years of modem gendercide"24 flies
in the face of India's hard-won independence, India's Constitution, and custom-
ary international law! 125 There are also several other reasons why international
human rights laws have failed to address the issue of bride-burning.'
26
121. Amnesty International, "Status of Ratification (as of 6 October 2004)", available at
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/treaty-countries-ratification-eng#ind (last visited on November 29,
2004)(stating the major international human rights instruments and its optional protocols, the coun-
tries who have signed and ratified these instruments, countries who have indicated reservations, and
countries who have not signed such instruments. India has ratified the human rights instruments, but
has not signed or ratified the optional protocols which would give brides and activist groups to file
complaints directly at the international level, thereby keeping victims and domesticinternational
activists imprisoned in an internal legal system that does not intend to ever protect brides being
burned to death.).
122. Under Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "reservation" is defined
as "...a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal
effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State," available at
http://www.un.orgllaw/ilc/texts/treaties.htm (last visited on November 29, 2004).
123. Amnesty International, "Status of Ratification (as of 6 October 2004)", available at
http://web.amnesty.orglpages/treaty-countries-ratification-eng#ind (last visited on November 29,
2004)(noting, for example, that the optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights or the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women would not only allow for individual complaints to be filed but states who sign and ratify the
optional protocol would recognize the competence of the HRC and CEDAW (respectively) to con-
sider individual complaints. As of October 6, 2004, India has not signed any of the major interna-
tional human rights protocols to allow for individual complaints. Furthermore, while India has
signed as a party to the Convention Against Torture, it has not ratified this important international
human rights instrument).
124. See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying texts on the discussion of gendercide and its
relevance to genocide and India's implicit approval of bride-burning.
125. See Thomas Buergenthal et al., PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 22-23 (West
Group; 3rd edition (August 1, 2002)("Customary international law develops from the practice of
states. To international lawyers, 'the practice of states' means official governmental conduct re-
flected in a variety of acts, including official statements at international conferences and in diplo-
matic exchanges, formal instructions to diplomatic agents, national court decisions, legislative meas-
ures or other actions taken by governments to deal with matters of international concern.); See also
International and Foreign Legal Research, Customary International Law and Generally Recognized
Principles" available at http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/intl/other.htm (last visited on November 29,
2004).
126. Shah, supra note 9, at 228.
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One of the primary reasons why international law is not a fully effective so-
lution is because of non-intervention and conflicting positions with regards to
United Nations intervention and state sovereignty rights.127 For example, at the
same time that the United Nations General Assembly ("UN") unanimously
adopts the Universal Declaration on Human Rights ("UDHR") articulating and
enumerating the essential protected human rights of all individuals, Article 2(7)
of the United Nations Charter ("UN Charter") protects a state's fundamental
right to be free from interference by other states. 20  Furthermore, the UN later
codified the state's right to self-determination in both the ICCPR and the
ICESCR. 29 By doing so, the UN places a state's right to self-determination and
self-governance above intervention to stop human rights violations occurring in
the state. This is narrow and, at worst, forecloses the international community's
reach into India to force compliance with customary international law. 130 In
addition, the Indian government has a valid argument in support of self-
determination because, according to India's elected body, India has taken af-
firmative steps to halt bride-burning and other dowry-related deaths.' 31
A second reason why international law is not effective in resolving this is-
sue is because international declarations do not have the force and effect of for-
mal international treaties or domestic legislation. Declarations, such as the
UHDR and the Declaration for the Elimination of Violence Against Women("DEVAW") are technically non-binding instruments that make public procla-
mations of views and intentions.'32 Declarations may evolve into binding cus-
tomary international law only to the extent that "it either crystallizes emergent
rules of law or attracts uniform practice by participating states."' 33 To the extent
that declarations are binding, the binding effect is usually seen in four key areas:
1) articulates perceived principles of customary international law; 2) directs the
127. Pardee, supra note 12, at 509.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Article One of both the ICCPR and ICESCR as stating, "all peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." In addition,... the 1970 UN Declara-
tion of Friendly Relations states that "by virtue of the principles of equal rights and self-determination.. all peoples have the right to determine, without external interference, their political
status.., and every state has the duty to respect this right..."). Id. at 509-10.
130. Id. at510.
131. Id.
132. "Options for treaty reform: declaration" available at
http://www.sentiscouncil.net/documents/biicl-fourth-Convention/options-treaty-reform (last visited
November 29, 2004)
133. "Options for treaty reform: declaration" available at
http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/biicl_fourth-convention/options-treatyreform (last visited
November 29, 2004) (discussing the definition, use, and effect of declarations within the context of a
global drug policy. Most importantly, discussing the effect of declarations made by United Nations
Conferences and their binding effect on domestic policy.)
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actions of UN agencies; 3) shapes the decisions and plans of domestic actors;
and 4) moulds political and public opinion. 1" Even if declarations may eventu-
ally cause a socio-political change in a state's political or legal system, the price
of that change is time and the cost of that evolution is another seventeen (17)
dead young women per day for an estimated total of 6,500 per year or 25,000
per year, depending on which set of statistics one wishes to believe.
35 Either
way, declarations have no practical binding effect and no enforcement value
until they are fully received by participating nations as customary international
law or codified via an international treaty.
1 36
Third, every major international treaty that protects human rights in general,
and girls and women's rights in particular, also protects the state's right and the
individual's right to enjoy their culture and retain their cultural development.1
37
International law, in many respects, is based on a cultural relativist paradigm,
a
'
3
meaning that naturally inherent in the right of self-determination is the right to
live out one's cultural life without interference, even if those cultural mores,
explicitly or implicitly, condone killing helpless individuals.
39 While it could
be argued that cultural development is important to national sovereignty, such an
argument is contrary to international human rights laws and those rights that
most countries regard as sacred, such as the right to life.M° However, countries
that refuse to comply with international human rights are the very same coun-
tries that will use cultural relativism as a defense against compliance with do-
134. "Options for treaty reform: declaration" available at
http://www.sentiscouncil.net/documentstbiicl-fourth-convention/options-treaty-reform (last visited
November 29, 2004)(arguing as an example that "the use of non-binding international instruments
[i.e., declarations] to formulate UN agency regulations can, in turn, precipitate international guide-
lines which may become internalized in the practices and legal systems of states."). However feasi-
ble this idea may be for economic or commercial issues, it is not practical when dealing with life and
death situations or cultural and religious mores that lead to cases of genocide/gendercide, this proc-
ess will likely take too long to save the victims. What is needed is a "911" type system.
135. See supra notes 63-78 and accompanying text (discussing the number of brides burned
and killed based on a variety of statistics.).
136. "Options for treaty reform: declaration" available at
http://www.sentiscouncil.net/documentstbiicl-fourth-convention/options-traty-reform (last visited
November 29, 2004).
137. Pardee, supra note 12, at510-11.
138. ld. at 510. Compare with a universalistic paradigm, where certain values and mores are
universally agreed to by all states and protected by all states, regardless of cultural practices. The
United Nations and international law, to date, have recognized the right of member and non-member
states to preserve and practice cultural differences.
139. Id.at510.
140. Id.at510-11.
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mestic and international human rights legislation. For example, on the present
issue of bride-burning, not only do UN declarations mandate non-intervention
and self-determination in the domestic issues of a state, but so does India's Con-
stitution through its multiple party political and legal system, a system designed
to keep key human rights issues such as bride-burning and dowry-related deaths
as far removed from the legal and political process as possible.'41 By setting up
inadequately enforced laws condemning dowry and bride-burning, establishing
All Women's Police Stations ("AWPS") to handle "women's issues" outside of
the normal police investigatory and judicial framework, sponsoring government-
funded "family counseling cells" near police stations with the intended goal of
strengthening family ties, and refusing to sign and ratify the UN optional proto-
cols which would allow for individual and non-governmental organization com-
plaints to be filed at the international level 142, India has set up a seemingly effec-
tive "smoke and mirrors" defense of complying with domestic law and custom-
ary international law. In actuality, however, the practical and statistical impact
of these initiatives is devastatingly clear: 1) reliance on the police as the first
line of defense is ineffective because the police have a long history of violence
and hostility towards women and they do not have adequate training in domestic
violence; 43 2) a total conflict of interest with perpetrators since most police are
men and most prosecutors and judicial officers are also men; 44 3) a marginaliza-
tion of the issue of bride-burning and dowry-related deaths as an issue of a
woman's maladjustment to marriage or a woman's bad temper rather than an
issue of domestic violence; 145 4) a marginalization of women's complaints of
domestic violence thus reducing the seriousness of the eventual killing;'" 5)
continued objectification and gender discrimination of women; 47 and 6) a con-
tinual, spiral escalation of bride-burning and related, more deadly forms of vio-
lence against Indian women in particular. 48
A fourth, rather dubious, explanation of why international law has failed to
stop bride-burning, as posited by some scholars, is that developing, overpopu-
lated nations such as India "simply cannot take on the social responsibility [of
areas such as family law] that other more developed nations are able to assume",
141. Id. at 511; see also Shah, supra note 9, at 210-1l; Gopal, supra note 166, at 65-68 (dis-
cussing India's Constitutional framework and the relationship to personal laws as it affects women's
rights in India).
142. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 810-14; see also Pardee, supra note 12, at 511-12.
143. Id. at 813.
144. Id. at 811.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 811-12.
147. Id. at 813-14 (quoting a district commission of police saying to a group of protesters in
regards to a recent case of severe spousal abuse of a pregnant woman that "this is not a case, it is an
incident... I have 5,000 incidents like this. It is a very ordinary matter.").
148. Krugman, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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thereby creating "deliberate gaps" in Indian legislation and "purposefully rely-
ing on social systems already in place to shoulder social and managerial burdens
[of these issues]."' 49  In addition, international laws that place humanitarian
obligations on such developing countries are an added, unsustainable burden
because the standards of such international human rights instruments as ICCPR,
ICESCR, and CEDAW are too high. Some scholars argue that India is not a
positivist state even if they have positive laws, and that certain provisions of
these human rights instrument are "plainly unrealistic in a developing nation.
'
However, these arguments fail since India purposefully and knowingly ratified
these international rights instruments. These arguments also fail because they
are simply excuses to continue to reap the benefits of being called "a developing
nation", while simultaneously behaving as a child with no control and a bully
within the context of state sovereignty.
Finally, international law (customary or treaty), even in its most honorable,
eloquent, and effective state, is not binding or enforceable even if the state has
signed and ratified it. It is simply not as strong as domestic legislation. It is
only as strong as the extent to which states abide by their treaty obligations or
customary international law norms and to the extent that other states enforce
these obligation on each other. With this in mind, most of the newly proposed
initiatives look to expanded protections for women in other existing domestic
laws in hopes of finally finding a solution that will stop brides from being
burned to death by their husbands and in-laws.
D. Proposed Initiatives to Stop Bride-Burning - Expanded Protections
Over the course of the last three years, scholars, activists, and concerned
citizens have proposed alternate initiatives to stop bride-burning since current
laws have failed and are flawed.
In addition to proposals ad nauseum to change India's current domestic leg-
islation against dowry and bride-burning,' 5' one alternate proposal is to expand
the protection for women under the international refugee law in order to provide
149. Shah, supra note 9, at 219-21.
150. Id. This only begs the question that if a country cannot keep its population from killing its
most defenseless persons or keep its female children from being killed before they are even born
simply because of their gender, can we really trust them with much else? Since when is a person's
right to life 'hard to understand' even for a developing nation?
151. Nangia, supra note 15, at 656-90.
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asylum to victims of gender discrimination such as the young women of India.'52
Currently there are three binding international agreements regarding refugees:
1) the Statute of the UNHCR; 2) the UN Convention; and 3) the Protocol to the
UN Convention. 5 3 The Statute of the UNHCR adopted a three-prong definition
of refugee.'54 However, the United Nation Convention ("Convention") has
adopted only the first two parts of the Statute of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees ("Statute") definition of refugee. Therefore, 'refugees'
today is defined as those "with a well-founded fear of persecution because of
their race, religion, nationality, or political opinion due to events occurring be-
fore 1951. '  However, persons meeting the definition under the Statute qualify
for UNHCR protection even if the person is not considered a refugee under the
Convention.'56 While the international refugee laws were created for the benefit
of persecuted and displaced persons such as the Jewish people during World
War II, today's refugees are "victims of violence or natural disasters", not vic-
tims of ideological persecution.'57 One method of accomplishing this objective
is to include "women" in the definition of the "social group" category of refugee
under the Protocol to the UN Convention. 5 8 By expanding the definition of this
category, women who have a well-grounded fear of persecution because of their
gender will be protected and can seek international asylum. 59 A similar resolu-
tion, recognizing the need to protect women from persecution on the basis of
gender was adopted by the European Parliament in April 1984.' 60 Unfortu-
nately, a proposal brought forth before the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees ("UNHCR") to follow the lead of the European Parliament was
rejected with the option left open to the individual states to consider. 6' While
the UNHCR recognizes state sovereignty, the result is that the international
152. Linda Cipriani, Gender and Persecution: Protecting Women Under International Refugee
Law, 7 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 511 (1993).
153. Id. at 533.
154. Id. at 533-34 (citing the three-pronged definition of refugee by the Statute of the
UNHCR).
155. Id. at534.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 511.
158. Id. at 512-13 (discussing the importance of the Protocol to the UN Convention because it
expanded the definition of refugee and included those persecuted because of their membership in a
particular social group.).
159. Id. at 512-14; 534-35 (arguing that this is especially relevant in the case of India where the
government seems to act as a co-conspirator in the oppression of and violence against women be-
cause of cultural or religious practices. Also "well-grounded fear of persecution" is the standard
used under current refugee law.).
160. Id. at 535-36 (discussing the European Parliament resolution which called on states in part
to "recognize the rights 'of women in certain countries who face harsh or inhuman treatment because
they are considered to have transgressed the social mores of the country' to be considered a "social
group" within the meaning of the definition of refugee in the Convention.").
161. Id.
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refugee laws will either be ignored with regards to gender-based persecution or
enforced inconsistently.
62
Another method for providing protection for victims of bride-burning or
other dowry- related violence under the international refugee laws is to expand
the definition of "refugee" to include "anyone having a well-grounded fear of
persecution because of gender". 163 This approach is problematic because of the
historical issues of defining "refugee" as well as "persecution". 1" In addition,
UNHCR would have to reach agreement with member states that refugees of
gender persecution will be allowed into receiving countries, a process which
could take years. 6 5
A third possible solution is to provide women increased economic interest
by establishing access to property rights for women' 66 Traditionally, women
had access over the stridhan that was given by the family and women retained
rights over the disposal of stridhan.167 However, the practice of stridhan has
given way to the current practice of dowry, in which the young bride has no
property interest and no economic interest at any point in the marriage.168 This
situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the bride has no rights over any
property belonging to the husband during his lifetime.' 69 The husband is free to
dispose, devise, or waste marital as well as non-marital property as he sees fit. 7°
A move towards giving women more economic interest through increased prop-
erty rights would certainly provide some parity between the parties. However,
current property rights legislation is not equality-based and legal attempts to
increase the property rights of women is a struggle because of the socio-
political, patriarchal nature of Indian cultural and religious underpinnings. 7'
Each of these alternative proposals has merit to the extent that more schol-
ars, activists, and members of the international community agree about a need
for change. However, these propositions are not any more effective than those
that currently exist and they require changes in a positivist system when the true
162. Id.
163. id. at 538.
164. Id. at541-43.
165. Id. at 542-43; 545-46.
166. Dr. Gita Gopal, Gender An Economic Inequality in India: The Legal Connection, 13 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 63, 67-68 (1993).
167. Id. at 69-70.
168. Id. at 68-69.
169. Id. at 72.
170. Id.
171. Id. at68-69.
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conflict may reside elsewhere in a non-positivist, impenetrable, complex world.
That is the focus of the next section - to determine the nature of the true con-
flict.
IV. PRESENT-DAY CONFLICT ANALYSIS FOR FUTURE CONFLICT RESOLUTION -
TALKING To THE ELEPHANT
To all the proponents of current domestic and international legislation, to
supporters of amending current positive law, imposing sanctions for violations
of international law, and proposing new laws to stop bride-burning, I say "Stop
the Madness!"
The current law is part of the problem, not the solution. We, as a concerned
body of international scholars, educators, lawmakers, mothers, fathers, sisters,
brothers, daughters, sons, friends, relatives, neighbors, and the future-born, must
look elsewhere because the law has failed us for over 2,500 years and it will
continue to fail us, albeit slowly so we do not recognize it. "The deck is
stacked"' 7 2 against the women of India! Only a careful understanding and
analysis of the conflict will force us to pause, reflect, and look at the real prob-
lems, thereby opening our minds to find real, effective, practical solutions. As
Albert Einstein so astutely stated, "No problem can be solved from the same
level of consciousness that created it."' 73 Therefore, the solution to the problem
of bride-burning lies outside the paradigm of positivist rules, patriarchal atti-
tudes, and victim mentalities.
A. Components of the Present-Day Conflict
The issue of intentionally dousing the bride with kerosene and letting her
burn to death as a result of one party's failed attempts at extorting more dowry
from the bride's parents or family is consistent with Pruitt and Kim's definition
172. "The deck is stacked" is an American colloquial term that indicates that even if there are
rules of fair play, they do not necessarily apply and most often, it affects those people for whom the
rules were intended to protect. In this case, the anti-dowry laws, anti-cruelty laws, the dowry murder
acts, and all international laws which should protect women do not apply equally or well, as evi-
denced by the male-dominated culture that enacted the laws, the patriarchal society that runs the
country, the male-dominated police force and legal system, as well as the intense, societal and cul-
tural subjugation women that is at the core of the religions of India. Basically, Indian brides are rats
trapped in a maze created by the very persons who will eventually kill them and where there is no
way out.. .at least so it seems.
173. Albert Einstein (1879 - 1955) was an American (German-born) theoretical physicist.
Einstein became a citizen of the United States in 1940, but also retained his Swiss citizenship.
Among his other well-known quotes is: "Any fool can make things bigger, more complex, and more
violent. It takes a touch of genius--and a lot of courage--to move in the opposite direction."
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of conflict. According to Pruitt and Kim, conflict is defined as "a perceived
divergence of interest, a belief the parties' current aspirations are incompati-
ble."' 74 This means that one party believes that if he/she gets what they want,
the other party will not get what he/she wants, setting the stage for potential
overt confrontation.'75 Interests are "people's feelings about what is basically
desirable."' 7 6 These interests are central to why people think the way they do
and consequently shape a person's actions and form "the core of many of their
attitudes, goals, and intentions. ' 17 Interests can be tangible, universal, or spe-
cific to certain actors. 178 Interests can also be hierarchical, such as one interest
having higher priority than another interest, or some interests can underlie other
interests. 179 As argued by Pruitt and Kim, before one party's interest can clash
with another party, the interests must be translated into aspirations, "mental
representations of the things that a party strives for or believes it must
achieve."' 18' Aspirations can be goals, such as the goal of earning a certain sal-
ary per year, or standards, in which a party may want to stay on good terms with
an ally.'8 ' Therefore, there is a conflict when one party (e.g., "Pl"=bride) and
another party (e.g., "P2"=groom) perceive that their aspirations are not compati-
ble and any available options do not satisfy both parties' aspirations. 82 In addi-
tion, if a party fails to achieve "reasonable aspirations," there will be an imme-
diate divergence of interest, resulting in the experience of relative deprivation.' 83
174. DEAN G. PRUITr & SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND
SETTLEMENT 7-8 (3" ed., McGraw-Hill Higher Education 2004).
175. Id. at8.
176. Id. at 15.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 16 (Tangible interests are things such as money, water, money, or territory. Intangi-
ble interests include power, honor, or recognition. Universal interests include basic human needs for
physical well being, security, identity, freedom, justice, respect, and clarity about one's world.)
179. Id. at 16.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Pruitt and Kim use "Party" and "Other" to represent what I have indicated as P1 and
P2. I use PI and P2 intentionally to indicate that there are two responsible parties to the conflict,
both of whom will have to be active in the resolution of the conflict. I also use "Other" to represent
an outside party. In this scenario, PI and P2 represent bridegroom and bride, respectively. I also
use this particular terminology as a paradigm shift such that "Party" and "Other" might represent a
"them vs. us" view and to not confuse it with a third-party who may be the source of the problem. I
use "Other" to represent third parties, such as in-laws or parents who have an indirect influence in
the issue of bride-burning. "Other" represents either the bridegroom's family (01) or the bride's
family (02).
183. Id. at 19-20.
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This deprivation is "relative" because a party feels deprived relative to a reason-
able standard,' 84 such that a party does not get what he/she feels or expects to get
in a given situation. The initial reaction to this deprivation may be frustration or
indignation; however if the source of the deprivation is a person or group, the
party feeling deprived may resort to contentious tactics against the perceived
source of deprivation. 85
The goal is to achieve an integrative solution to the problem, one where the
parties' interests reconcile, thereby reducing the perceived conflict.1 86 However,
what frequently happens is that P1 (bride) compromises more than P2 (groom),
resulting in a partisan alternative, where one party's aspirations are met at the
expense of another party's aspirations.'87 This situation is further complicated
by the imposition of the aspirations of a third-party ("Other") as in the case of
dowry-deaths and bride-burning. The "Other" party in this case includes the
bride's parents ("O1") and the groom's parents ("02"). Each of these parties has
aspirations with respect to the impending marriage, dowry, and life thereafter.
Therefore, there could potentially be several layers of conflicts occurring simul-
taneously, including: 1) between P1 and P2; 2) between P1 and 01; 3) between
P2 and 02; 4) between P1 and 02; 5) between P2 and 01; and 6) between 01
and 02. This situation is then further exacerbated by societal and cultural pres-
sures, real or perceived, to preserve traditions for future generations.
Applying the components of conflict described above, the issue of bride-
burning is complex, yet it is also relatively simple. Bride-burning has its roots
in the system of dowry, a cultural practice that involves a negotiation between
the family of the bride and the family of the groom for money or property in
exchange for the marriage of the daughter, conducted in an environment laced
with unequal bargaining power, coercion, social inequality and financial hard-
ship for the bride and her family. '
In this case, Other's aspirations have priority over P1 and P2's aspirations
and P2's aspirations have priority over P1's aspirations. The bride's parents'
aspirations are driven by improving their social status or standard of living as
184. Id.
185. Id. (describing the nature of relative deprivation and arguing that one does not need rela-
tive deprivation to have divergence of interest which creates a conflict, but that a divergence of
interest can be based on statements of motive or lack of trust exhibited between Party and Other.
Furthermore, parties may use contentious tactics regardless of whether there is an experience of
relative deprivation).
186. Id. at 16.
187. Id. Integrative solutions could be considered "win-win", while partisan alternatives would
be considered "win-lose".
188. Nangia, supra note 15, at 644-45; See also Shannon S. Ragsdale and Vanessa D. Camp-
bell, Protection of the Female Child: The Mothers of Our Future - Case Studies of India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 177, 194 (1999)(discussing dowry killings
in the context of the plight of the female child in India.).
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well as the goal of ridding the family of an "economic liability" in the form of
their daughter. 89 The groom's parents aspire to increase their social standards
through a large dowry and to find a bride for their son who will bear children to
continue the family name. 9 Furthermore, P2's aspirations include finding a
bride, but also gaining sufficient dowry to take care of her, their new family, and
P2's birth family. This is further complicated by society's view that P2's value
is greater than P1, P2 retains all economic and property interest, and P1 has no
value as a human being apart from serving P1 and being a reproductive slave.' 9'
The societal, cultural and religious interests are overreaching and hierarchi-
cally superior to those who compose the society. Therefore, we have a hierar-
chy of interests among the parties, interests that are defined in terms of measur-
able (goals) and immeasurable (standards) aspirations, and a true conflict be-
cause the aspirations of the parties are not compatible given that it results in the
death of one of the parties 92 and the loss of any benefit that may have been
gained by any of the parties.
One of the reasons for the perceived conflict is that both sides, or all sides
in this issue, are engage in zero-sum thinking. Zero-sum thinking is the belief
that "the other's gain is one's own loss, and vice versa."' 93 This only encourages
the conflict when, in reality, zero-sum thinking is a faulty belief because, in
nearly all cases, parties have compatible interests but they are blind to see
them. 94
Another reason is ambiguity about each party's relative power and an im-
probable set of invidious comparisons created by status inconsistencies as per-
189. Ragsdale, supra note 188, at 194(discussing the fact that the practice of dowry only fur-
ther reinforces the belief that female children are "economic liabilities"). See also Shah, supra note
9, at 214(citing that the "bride's family is just as culpable.. .seek to elevate their status, not through
the acquisition of material goods, but through their daughter's marriage into a family with a caste or
class higher than their own.")
190. Shah, supra note 9, at 214(stating that "...groom's family is typically in a position of
greater bargaining power in Indian marriage negotiations.. .groom's family often chooses a woman
of lower casete or class and demands a high dowry... secure in the knowledge that such demands
will be.. .satisfied, since the marriage will bring the much-desired status to the bride's family...").
191. Ragsdale, supra note 188, at 194-95; Nangia, supra note 15, at 645-47.
192. Of course, the assumption here is that the death of the bride is significant enough that it
was not the desired end-result or an aspiration. It is also assumed that neither party or Other goes
into the process of marriage or dowry with the intent of causing the death of the bride, regardless of
their motivations.
193. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 22.
194. Id. (stating that a faulty belief can be the main culprit to escalating the conflict (citing
Thompson & Hrebec, 1996)).
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petuated by the Indian caste system and the continuing practice of dowry.'95 The
caste system reinforces the notion that one group should be afforded more
wealth or power simply by virtue of their birthright while the practice of dowry
perpetuates the belief that one party is stronger than another and therefore has
greater bargaining power, causing the bride's family to unnecessarily give up ten
years of salary for virtually nothing in return.' 96 The result is distrust between
castes, lack of normative consensus between different groups who want to
achieve the same level of aspirations, and inter-group conflict because of a per-
ceived lack of tangible or intangible resources, ending in active ethnocentrism.'97
One could easily argue that the parties in the Indian society have set themselves
up to completely fail in trying to achieve any sense of honorable solution to the
issue of bride-burning, much less to the myriad of other problems that face their
country. The fate of each individual is sealed to unending conflict unless there
is a significant shift in consciousness either internally or with the help of the
international community.
B. Strategy of Conflict and Use of Tactics
The views of the parties about each other, the relationship between the par-
ties, and the source and nature of the inter-group (i.e., inter-caste) conflicts are
volatile dynamics which lead the parties to engage in conflict-management tac-
tics that only escalate the conflict.
According to Pruitt and Kim, there are four basic strategies for settling a
conflict: 1) contending or using contentious tactics to lower the other party's
aspirations; 2) problem-solving to find a way to satisfy both parties' interests; 3)
yielding, which involves agreeing to the other party's demands; and 4) avoiding
the conflict altogether by being inactive or withdrawing from the conflict alto-
195. Id.
196. Pardee, supra note 12, at 497 n.48; Ragsdale, supra note 188, at 194 (stating that "a typi-
cal dowry is the equivalent of a family's total earnings for several years."); See also Angela K.
Carlson-Whitley, Dowry Death: A Violation of the Right to Life Under Article Six of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 637, 640 (1994)(stating that
"a family is required to raise a dowry many times the annual earnings of the household to marry off
their daughter."); Ravikant, supra note 3, at 459(stating that "...even the poorest Indian families
spend more than $3,000 on a wedding, which is the equivalent of nearly ten years' income for an
average worker." "The price for having a daughter is debt and "economic bondage" for many Indian
families.").
197. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 29 (ethnocentrism is favoring one's own group over another
group. This can occur from having a social identity or from engaging in similar activities or having
similar aspirations. In this context, ethnocentrism refers to the in-group/out-group effect and favorit-
ism caused by the rigid caste system. The social identity theory was developed by Tajfel and Turner
(1979, 1986) and holds that "mere awareness of the presence of the out-group is sufficient to pro-
voke intergroup competitive or discriminatory responses on the part of the ingroup.").
28
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol5/iss2/3
[Vol. 5: 2, 2005]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
gether."9t In the case of bride-burning, the parties, especially the groom and the
groom's family choose to handle the conflict through contentious tactics by
coercing the bride and her family to yield to their demands. Furthermore, the
contending and yielding tactics are being used within the context of blame direc-
tion and culture' 99 as backdrops to the strategic choice made in attempting to
solve the problem.
The most glaring influence on the strategy and tactics employed to create
the conflict prevalent in the case of bride-burning is the impact of culture.2°
India is considered a collectivist culture. 2°' As a collectivist culture, several key
observations are relevant to understanding why Indian society has adopted
dowry practice, why it continues today despite devastating implications, and
why current and proposed alternatives to stop bride-burning have failed to effec-
tively control the unnecessary deaths of young Indian women for the last 50
years.20 2 First, the primary motivation for a collectivist culture is interdepend-
ence, group welfare, group harmony, and equality.203 As a result, group goals
and interests take precedence over individual goals and interests, resulting in a
198. Id. at 5-7 and 37-39 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 39-40 (articulating "four sets of theoretical notions about the conditions that affect
choice among the basic strategies" of contending, yielding, problem-solving, and avoiding. These
four perspectives include: 1) the dual concern model (based on relative strength of concern about
Party's and Other's outcomes); 2) the perceived feasibility perspective (related to the perceived
likelihood of success and the cost or risk of enacting the various strategies); 3) the blame direction
model (which uses self-blame, other-blame, or mutual blame as a means to solve the problem); and
4) the impact of culture (individualism vs. collectivism as it affects conflict management tactics).
200. Id. at 56-62 (Culture, as used in this article is defined as "the set of shared and enduring
meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups." (Faure & Rubin,
1993). According to Pruitt and Kim, culture is "an important determinant of people's attitudes, self-
construal, and behavior, and hence their strategic choice [in resolving conflict]." (citing Avruch
(1998), Cohen (1991) and Faure & Rubin (1993)).
201. Id. (highlighting the differences between individualism and collectivism and how this
affects the creation of conflict. Countries in Asia are generally considered to be collectivist cultures,
such as China, Japan, India, Korea, etc. North American and European countries are generally
individualist cultures.). As Pruitt and Kim point out, the notion of cultures as based on individual-
ism and collectivism are derived from the works of Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1995).
202. I indicate a period of 50 years as beginning at the point when India obtained its independ-
ence from Great Britain and began a period of self-governance. Certainly, bride-burnings likely
occurred even during the Vedic period near 300 B.C., when dowry was initiated; however, the cur-
rent modern period is to provide some context within which to compare why current methods to
solve the bride-burning issue have failed.
203. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 56 (Individualist cultures, by contrast, place greater value on
independence, personal achievement, rights, freedoms, and equity. In addition, members of an
individualist culture place personal goals and interests ahead of group goals and interest within the
hierarchy of interests.).
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situation where individuals are essentially required to sacrifice their goals and
interests in order to achieve and maintain group harmony and group welfare. 2°4
In the case of bride-burning, the groom and the bride appear to be pawns in the
chess game between their respective families to increase their material wealth,
upgrade to a better standard of living, and improve their social status. Certainly
the bride has no voice and no right to assert her independence or her interests.
Both the bride and groom are fated to a life defined for men and women nearly
2,500 years ago, a standard that is inconsistent with living in the world today.
Furthermore, families perpetuate the gender-biased roles of men and women as
well as the roles of groups defined by Indian religious and cultural mythology
by subjecting themselves to countless rituals and financial hardships at the ex-
pense of group harmony and group welfare. This game is further complicated
by cultural and religious norms which regard families having a daughter as dis-
advantaged over families having a son, one caste having superior status over
another caste, and the impenetrable history of female subjugation and cultural
disintegration. 5
Second, with respect to conflict management, collectivist cultures like India
tend to handle conflict via indirection. 21 Instead of confronting conflict, mem-
bers of a collectivist culture tend to avoid dealing with conflict, have an aversion
to confrontation, and especially do not like the use of contentious tactics. 27 In
dealing with conflict, collectivist cultures engage in indirect, covert problem
solving such as working through intermediaries.0 8 One of the primary ways this
approach is manifested is through the ingroup/outgroup paradigm.2' Collectiv-
ist cultures generally function according to a common group identity.210 Mem-
bers of a common group will be part of the "ingroup" and those outside of the
common group identity are considered part of the "outgroup" or opponents.211
This has several implications with regards to the strategy and tactics used
between ingroups and outgroups to handle conflict. Collectivist cultures are
more likely to distrust outgroup members, have a weak sense of fairness or no
sense of fairness with respect to outgroup members, and more likely to use de-
ceptive tactics when negotiating with outgroup members.1 2 In addition, mem-
bers of an ingroup tend to adopt much harsher, contentious tactics against out-
204. Id.
205. See supra notes 13-58 and accompanying text.
206. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 57 (discussing the nature of conflict resolution in individualist
cultures versus collectivist cultures.).
207. Id. However, the tactics that result in bride-burning are contentious, yet very much in
keeping within the context of collectivist cultures.
208. Id. (citing Gelfland et al., 2001).
209. Id. at 59-60.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 60.
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group members, treating outgroup members as "nonpersons" or "unfamiliar
faces" against whom violence is not only expected, but can easily be justified."3
The ramification of being part of the outgroup is the loss of protection as a
member of an ingroup, the loss of one's moral community, and the threat of
violence should the outgroup member appear to threaten ingroup welfare and
harmony,214 apparently even if this means asserting the right to life as in the case
of bride-burning and other dowry-related deaths. As asserted by Triandis, a
noted expert on culture and conflict, "collectivists are extremely hospitable,
cooperative, and helpful towards ingroups but can be rude, exploitative, and
even hostile towards their outgroups. '2 15 With respect to the issue of bride-
burning, the Indian girl and the Indian women today should be a member of the
ingroup with respect to her birth family. However, it is quite clear from the
historical analysis of women in the Indian culture as well as the practice of
dowry that an Indian girl is born as a member of an outgroup without any
choice, a group defined simply on the basis of gender, regardless of other sup-
porting factors such as caste, culture, or religion.
Because she is a woman and because she is Indian, she is a non-person,
even if she is born within a wealthy family. Even within her immediate family,
she is part of the outgroup because she is considered an "economic burden."2"6
Therefore, it is not uncommon for girl children in India to be treated with less
respect and care even in her own family." 7 Because she is treated as a member
of an outgroup, a future Indian bride does not receive the same type of protec-
tion in society as a future groom. When she is married off, most often to some-
one of a higher caste, she becomes a member of an ingroup consisting of the
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. (citing Triandis (1990) at pg. 42).
216. Pardee, supra note 12, at 493; Ravikant, supra note 3, at 459(noting that having a daugh-
ter is considered debt and "economic bondage" for Indian families); Nangia, supra note 15, at
648(discussing the fact that even an educated woman is discouraged from being independent and
earning an independent woman. Women who strive academically or professionally with the goal of
becoming independently self-sufficient are viewed as arrogant or licentious.).
217. Beverly Horsburgh, Deconstructing Children's Rights and Reimagining Children's
Needs: A Gender, Race, and Class Analysis of Infanticide, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 229 n.8
(1998)(stating that girls are consistently underfed and deprived of medical care.). See also MARILYN
FRENCH, THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN, 115-116 (1992); S.H. Venkatramani, Female Infanticide:
Born to Die in FEMICIDE: THE POLITICS OF WOMAN KILLING (Jill Radford and Diana Russell eds.,
1992). Female children in India are subject to female infanticide, malnourishment, less education,
gender discrimination and less economic opportunities because they are female and less valued than
males.
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higher caste, but she is always treated and regarded as an outgroup member,
especially in the family of her in-laws. The dowry further supports her outgroup
status throughout her life since the bride's family offers the dowry as "pay-off'
for the ingroup to take the daughter (i.e., the economic burden) off of her par-
ent's hands. Societal, cultural, and religious ideology and practices firmly ce-
ment the Indian woman's fate as a member of a gender-based outgroup by re-
garding women as troublemakers, slaves to their husbands, and born for the sole
purpose of procreation and patriarchal servitude.2"8
The enactment of the Dowry Prohibition Act and Anti-Cruelty statutes,
while attempting to halt the practice bride-burning, only cause further conflict
between ingroups and outgroups. A girl's family is not likely to decline paying
a dowry because the societal and financial pressures are too great.21 9 Further-
more, neither the girl's family nor the groom's family will report abuse of dowry
or dowry-related violence much less admit to bride-burning because the poten-
tial imprisonment of the male members of both families as well as mutual blame
would result in both families having primary breadwinners in jail.22° Again, this
apparently has greater societal and financial implications than seeking to avenge
the death of a woman already considered as an outcast.
22 1
Furthermore, the legal attempts to halt the practice of dowry and prevent
dowry-related deaths, such as bride-burning are individualist remedies to collec-
tivist problems. Remedies are based on individualist notions of fairness in re-
sponse to collectivist interpretations of the problem. 222 Some have even argued
that India's Constitution is a positivist document imposed by an individualist
mindset attempting to govern a people whose way of life is inconsistent with its
own legal and political system.223 For example, the legal system allows for the
individualist way of solving conflict, by confronting conflict rather than avoid-
ing it and by direct problem solving with the other person or through the court
system. 224 However, India's Constitutional and legal framework is set up so as
to delineate between constitutional guarantees and personal or customary laws
(i.e., laws that govern matters such as family, marriage, divorce, child support,
etc.) such that personal or customary laws fall outside of the legal system for
remedies.225 In addition, to date, there has been no constitutional challenge to
218. See supra notes 13-58 and accompanying text.
219. Shah, supra note 9, at 214 (stating that despite protections of law, the parents of the girl
child are not likely to discourage dowry).
220. Shah, supra note 9, at 216 (stating that the criminalization of dowry and dowry deaths is
ineffective because of placing blame on the families and the resulting loss of key family members).
221. Ravikant, supra note 3 at 457.
222. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 60 (distinguishing between individualist and collectivist notions
of fairness in the distribution of resources.).
223. Gopal, supra note 166, at 66-68.
224. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 56-57.
225. Gopal, supra note 166, at 66.
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the practice of dowry or the ensuing torture, humiliation, and enslavement of
women as a violation of India's constitutional guarantee of equality. In this
context, a positivist or individualist approach to a collectivist problem is useless
without first acknowledging that India's constitutional guarantee of equality
applies to all and that the female child in India has a legal right worth vindicat-
ing. As it is, being perceived as a non-person is the equivalent of being non-
existent, thereby having no right at all. It is no wonder that legislative attempts
to halt the practice of dowry or bride-burnings have, to date, miserably failed.
A second, major influence on the strategy and tactics employed by parties
involved in bride-burning is blame direction. Blame direction is essentially
attributing the cause of the conflict in one of three directions: 1) the other party
(other-blame); 2) themselves (self-blame); and 3) both parties (mutual-
blame).2 6 When other-blame is used, parties will mainly use contentious tactics
because both are engaged in zero-sum thinking. 227 This creates the perception
that one part is being treated unfairly at the hands of another party, which pro-
duces anger and further escalates the contentious behavior.228 When self-blame
is used, parties find fault within themselves for the conflict. 2 9 Self-blame tends
to produce yielding behavior because the party feels a sense of guilt 23° for hav-
ing caused the conflict and believes that "one must atone for one's misdeeds. 23'
Self-blame is more likely when the conflict is mild while other-blame is preva-
lent in more intense conflicts.232
The situation that ultimately leads to the untimely deaths of young women
in India via bride-burning is the result of this endless cycle of other-blame and
self-blame. The future bride's family blames the girl-child simply for being
born a girl, treating her as "economic bondage" and relegating her to the status
of an outcast. The parents then unnecessarily carry with them the guilt of self-
blame because they gave birth to a girl. This guilt is further reinforced by socie-
tal mores that regard families having a girl child as, on the one hand, obligated
226. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 53 (citing Orvis et al., 1976; Shaver, 1985)(Under the blame-
direction paradigm, people ask attribution-type questions such as "Who is responsible for this con-
flict?" and "Who is to blame?").
227. Id. at 54.
228. Id. at 60 (arguing that feelings of being unfairly treated only justify using harsher tactics
by one party against the other.).
229. Id. (stating that self-blame is not uncommon as a mean of retaining control over events
which one cannot control (citing Andrews & Brewin, 1990; Bulman & Wortman, 1977)).
230. Id. at 54 (citing Lazarus, 1991).
231. Id. at 54-55 (citing Freedman et al., 1967; Konoske at al., 1979).
232. Id. at 55.
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to give up the girl child to a family to serve society as a whole, and on the other
hand, as being socially disadvantaged. In this way, the family with a girl child
may feel almost doubly victimized, first by being seen as an outgroup for having
a daughter and second, by knowing that the majority of their lives will have to
be spent saving up enough dowry to marry off their daughter. These are enor-
mous pressures.
Furthermore, society implicitly blames and punishes families with girls by
constantly reminding them of the burden of dowry and the gruesome alternatives
for bearing a female child, such as selective female abortions and female infan-
ticide.233 In turn, a girl child in India is keenly aware of her lowly status on the
totem pole and goes through a destructive pattern of self-blame and a near ob-
sessive pattern of guilt for what her parents must go through, believing that she
is at fault and resigns herself to eventual fate. If she is unable to cope with this
guilt, the tremendous societal pressures, negative messages, and the inability of
her family to raise a sufficient dowry might eventually lead her to commit sui-
cide, a sad yet very common practice these days among young women who are
reaching marriageable age in India. In fact, most recently, four young Indian
women committed suicide together and left a note stating that they could no
longer bear the pain it was causing their parents in attempting to collect enough
dowry for their future marriage.234 They ended their lives in sacrifice for their
brothers and parents to have a future free from this coercive and corrosive prac-
235tice.
The groom's family, knowing that they have the upper hand in the dowry
negotiations, will generally practice other-blame, reminding the bride's family
that they are of a lower caste, blaming the bride's family for having insufficient
dowry or raising a girl that is not worthy of the groom. Regardless of how ca-
pable of a wife or mother the bride is, the husband and in-laws regard her as an
outgroup member and will blame her for minor shortcomings, resorting to vio-
lence without the need to justify their actions. The groom and his family always
regard themselves as part of the 'ingroup' simply by virtue of having a son in
the family. When combined with the bride-family's guilt over having a daugh-
ter, the bride's family will generally yield to the demands of the groom and his
family regarding the amount of dowry. Therefore, regardless of the amount of
dowry paid or extorted, the bride and her family will always be outgroup mem-
bers in relation to the groom and his family. This is the insidious side effect of
233. Krugman, supra note 63, at 221-24.
234. "Indian Dowry Massacre: Mom Kills 3 Girls Then Herself', S Paknews.com, Updated on
2002-09-18 04:44:36 available at http://indianterrorism.bmvepages.comIndianWomen2.htm (last
visited November 29, 2004); India's Hidden Tragedy, BOSTON GLOBE, August 4, 1991, at A26 (in
1988, three sisters hanged themselves from a ceiling fan because of dowry issues and the fear that
their parents would face dowry burdens when it came their turn to marry)
235. Id.
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combining two volatile elements, hoping to have a happy ending. It is the
equivalent of lighting a match at a gas station, like oil and fire.
Furthermore, as the current body of literature, articles, and analyses clearly
indicates, India, as a collectivist society, sees itself as an ingroup and attributes
the problem of bride-burning and dowry-related deaths to external or outgroup
elements. By blaming this problem on external factors such as "women's
tongues", a woman's role in society, western consumerism, the residual effects
of British colonialism, or even 'greed', India loses the opportunity to truly un-
derstand the underlying issues, engage in true problem solving through a democ-
ratic process, and assert its independence as a self-governing nation. Instead, by
employing other-blame tactics, members of the Indian community lose "face"
and a critical opportunity to show the world that it can address the social ills that
plague the nation. However, by switching to self-blame or even mutual-blame,
members of the Indian community can rise above to set an example for
neighboring nations in this issue, as they are doing so in the commercial and
technology arena, by taking responsibility and engaging in true problem solving.
When parties see conflict primarily from the vantage point of the impact of
culture and blame direction, they employ tactics of contending and yielding.236
Contending involves the use of contentious tactics by imposing one's preferred
solution onto the other party, usually by persuading or forcing the other party to
yield.237 Contentious tactics lie on a continuum between the less contentious
practice of ingratiation and the most contentious tactic of violence.238 Yielding
essentially involves capitulating to the other party's demands by "lowering
own's own aspirations and settling for less than one would have liked. 239
Yielding can take the form of settling for less than expected, carving out a com-
promise, giving up something in exchange for the other party also giving up
something, or simply giving in to the other party's demands.24
236. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 53-60.
237. Id. at 63.
238. Id. at 63-81 (the list of contentious tactics here includes the following: 1) ingratiation; 2)
promises; 3) persuasive argumentation; 4) shaming; 5) tit-for-tat; 6) threats; 7) coercive commit-
ments; and 8) violence. Nonviolent resistance is also a tactic that can be used by low power groups
to challenge the status quo without employing violence and could be considered a contentious tactic.
A perfect example is the set of actions taken by Mohandas K. Gandhi (e.g., fasts) to secure conces-
sions from the British forces that occupied India and eventually win India's independence from
Britain.)
239. Id. at 5.
240. Id. at 5. The authors point out that yielding is an active strategy in the sense that it in-
volves a "relatively consistent, coherent effort to settle a conflict." However, I disagree to the extent
that if one is being coerced or threatened, yielding is not necessarily active strategy as much as a
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In the case of bride-burning, the groom and his family use various conten-
tious tactics to demand more dowry at various stages, eventually justifying the
horrific act of burning the bride by claiming that it was a 'kitchen accident' or
blaming the bride or her family in some way. Contentious tactics used by the
husband and his in-laws include ingratiation, shaming, threats, and violence
leading to mutilation or death.241 For example, ingratiation could be accom-
plished simply by the prospective groom's family pretending to fairly negotiate
the dowry demand or agreeing not to ask for a dowry at the time of marriage.
While the bride's family thinks well of the prospective groom, what they do not
realize is that the groom's family is only setting the stage for demanding dowry
after the marriage or quietly extorting dowry throughout the married life of the
couple by other means such as "gifts" for future born children, social functions,
political contributions, etc.242 In so doing, the prospective groom's family are
also outside the scope of the seven-year statute of limitations for the Dowry
Prohibition Act and the Dowry Murder Acts.243
An example of shaming is the case of Prema. Prema was married with a
daughter and worked at a factory. As a result of pressures at home, she fled
from her husband's home to live with her friend. 2' Upon returning to her job,
she found the walls of the factory "covered with signs saying that she was a slut
who had run off with another man. 245 She was forced to work alone and spent
most of time crying until she eventually returned to her husband after two years
because of the social pressures of not living with her husband, not being able to
get a divorce, and in fear for her daughter's well-being.246 Everyone had ex-
posed her and made her feel ashamed for not making her marriage work. In
passive reaction to avoid grave harm in some way. In the case of bride-burning, there are other
factors that force a party to yield, whether consciously or unconsciously.
241. Id. at 63-80 (ingratiation is defined as a "tactic in which Party tries to make itself more
attractive to Other in an effort to prepare the Other for subsequent exploitation." Shaming is the "act
of causing Other to feel the emotion of shame, the painful feeling characterized by a global condem-
nation of oneself.. .usually achieved by publicizing Other's defects or transgressions." (citing Smith
et al, 2002). Threats are "message[s] from Party announcing the intention to hurt Other if Other fails
to comply with Party's wishes." They differ in degree of explicitness. Violence is "behavior that is
intended to physically injure another person or an object valued by another person." There is in-
strumental violence, whose aim is to advance Party's cause in a conflict with other, and emotional
violence, where harming Other is an end in itself and involves emotions of anger, hostility, or the
desire for revenge directed at Other. Most violence is a combination of instrumental and emotional.
242. Nangia, supra note 15, at 645-47 (discussing the extensive nature of dowry demands even
after the bride and groom are married, such as when a child is born, the child reaches a certain age,
etc.)
243. Id. at 658 (noting that many future in-laws bypass the dowry prohibition act by not de-
manding a dowry at the time of marriage, but doing so after the marriage, thus being outside the
scope of the protection of the law.)
244. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 838.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 838-39.
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addition, unmarried women as well as families of unmarried women are made to
feel ashamed and useless simply for being unmarried or having a daughter who
is unmarried. Shaming is a most devastating contentious tactic, considered a
"highly potent way to elicit compliance" '247 and the "most powerful tool of social
control."24 8
Threats are also very common in the issue of bride-burning as the primary
form of dowry-related deaths. For example, six months after Santara was mar-
ried, her in-laws began to threaten her for more dowry.249 Her mother-in-law
told her "Why don't you go home and get 50,000 rupees (about $1,600), other-
wise we'll throw kerosene on you."25 Eventually, because Santara's family
could not provide the additional dowry, Santara's mother-in-law carried out her
threat and poured kerosene on her."' Santara was able to run and hide at a
neighbor's home before the mother-in-law could set her on fire.252 Unfortu-
nately, she had to return to her in-laws because her mother refused to take back a
married daughter, saying that she could "not keep a married daughter with
me.. .it would mean more and more dishonor for me. 2 53
Finally, violence is used most often, in varying degrees, with the most
common result being death by burning of the bride. In one case, a woman was
kicked in the stomach while she was in the late stages of pregnancy and then
subsequently beaten after a caesarian delivery, all within eyewitness of
neighbors whose calls for help for the woman went unheeded.254 In another
incident in April 1993, a young, twenty-three year old Indian woman was re-
strained by her husband, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law while they injected
acid into her arms as punishment for inadequate dowry.255 Yet another incident
involved a husband who was so angry with a small dowry that he beat his wife
and forced pesticide down her throat, causing her death within a few hours.256 In
another typical case, Savita Sharma's in-laws made demand for additional
dowry in the form of a refrigerator, scooter, television set and cash. 7 In addi-
247. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 69 (citing Etzioni, 2001).
248. Id. (citing Braithwaite, 1989). The most classic example of shaming is depicted in the
novel, A Scarlett Letter (Hawthorne, 1850/1962, pg. 45).
249. Pardee, supra note 12, at 491.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 813.
255. Krugman, supra note 63, at 224-25.
256. Id.
257. Nangia, supra note 15, at 637.
285
37
Lakhani: Bride-Burning: The "Elephant in the Room" Is Out of Control
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2005
tion, Savita's mother-in-law verbally abused her, did not give her enough food
to eat, beat her (as did her husband) and locked up all her clothes.25 Savita once
overheard her mother-in-law tell a tenant "I will bum her and then give money
to the police to hush up the case."2 9 Finally, another reminder of Sunita Mir. In
1993, less than two years after her marriage, Sunita's father-in-law and brother-
in-law held her down on a cot, while her husband doused her with kerosene and
set her alight.2' 6 Sunita died in the hospital, having suffered from bums over
96% of her body."26'
These tactics or a variation of these tactics are then used against the bride's
family, causing them to yield and give into the demands of their in-laws. If the
bride or her family cannot or do not comply with the demands, the bride is
surely at risk of being burned to death or led to commit suicide because of pres-
sure from in-laws and society.
C. Escalation and the Persistence of Violence Thereafter
A continual cycle of contending and yielding eventually escalates 262 the
problem unless there is a perceived stalemate 263 from which to de-escalate the
conflict and move towards integrative solutions.2" Bride-burning and the events
that lead up to bride-burning are a classic example of the contender-defender
model of escalation. 265 In the contender-defender model, one party is viewed as
"having a goal of creating change that places it in conflict" with the other party.
This goal may consist of taking something from the other, to alter their reality at
the expense of the other party or to stop the other party's annoying behavior.266
The party with the goal (contender) usually starts with less contentious tactics
such as ingratiation, promises, or shaming. However, if the contender does not
achieve the goal through less risky tactics, the contender will eventually resort to
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. id.
262. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 88-89 (describing and using escalation to mean that "one of the
participants in conflict is using heavier tactics than before - is putting greater pressure on the other
participant" or that "there is an increase in the intensity of the conflict as a whole").
263. Id. at 172(defining "perceived stalemate" as "a situation in which one (or better, both) of
the parties perceives that it cannot make further progress in the conflict at an acceptable cost or risk
- that further efforts to win through escalation are unworkable and/or unwise." (citing Zartman
(1989, 2000), who was the originator of the ripeness theory, a theory of the conditions under which
severe conflicts move into negotiation and mediation.)). Pruitt and Kim differ with Zartman in term
of what constitutes a stalemate.
264. Id. at 192; See infra notes 304-11 and accompanying text.
265. Id. at 92 (citing Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974, who defined three basic models of escalation: 1)
the contender-defender model; 2) the conflict-spiral model; and 3) the structural change model.).
266. Id. at 65-69,93.
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heavier contentious tactics such as threats, coercive commitments, and eventu-
ally violence.267 In the contender-defender model, the other party (defender)
may be passive or may escalate the conflict, but only as a defensive measure.
Party's escalation of the conflict is never in defense and is used strategically and
intentionally to achieve their goal. 268 The contender-defender model appears to
present one side as being mainly at fault; however, Pruitt and Kim argue that, in
reality, both sides usually contribute equally to a conflict, 269 such that the con-
flict-spiral model may be a better description. Furthermore, James Gilligan, a
psychiatrist, states that "I have yet to see a serious act of violence that was not
provoked by both parties' experience of feeling shamed and humiliated, disre-
spected and ridiculed, and that did not represent the attempt to prevent or undo
this 'loss of face' - no matter how severe the punishment, even if it includes
death.
270
The relationship between dowry and bride-burning involves many parties,
both active and passive. Each party is claiming to be the victim or 'defender'
since the major reasons for why these practices continue has been blamed on
external factors.27' In this case, the groom and his parents are likely contenders
because they have greater bargaining power and are usually of a higher caste. In
the specific instance of bride-burning, the bride is clearly in a defensive position
and holds very weak bargaining power. Furthermore, because of society's per-
ception of women and the financial burden created by having to offer a dowry,
the bride's family also appears to have a weak stance. The escalation tactics
used by the groom and his parents, therefore, have a great deal of power over the
other parties. In addition, the groom and his parents demand a greater dowry
and attempt to extort additional dowry after marriage in order to accumulate
material wealth and improve their social standing, a goal which they believe is
fairly achieved at the expense of the bride and her family's financial resources.
In some cases, the bride's family is unable to defend itself or retaliate because
they do not have the resources to do either. Finally, the bride is sacrificed and
burned as the ultimate act of revenge for having suffered a 'loss of face' for
marrying an inadequate woman with insufficient material wealth.
Though it would be easy to place the full blame on the groom and his par-
ents, the bride and her family are equally to blame for perpetuating the myth that
267. Id. at 71-80, 93.
268. Id. at 93.
269. Id. at 96.
270. Id. at 95 (quoting James Gilligan, 1996, pg. 1 10).
271. See supra notes 13-58 and accompanying text.
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a daughter is less valuable than a son, that an unmarried or divorced daughter
casts a stain on the family name, that a dowry must exceed normal living stan-
dards, and that any family is entitled to more than was originally negotiated. In
addition, the bride's family is a willing party in the escalation of the conflict by
consistently yielding to large dowry demands or subsequent dowry demands
until they are so completely depleted that the only alternative is to bum the
bride. By yielding to the demands of the contender, the bride's parents give the
contender the impression that there is more available and when the defender
does not or cannot comply further, the groom and his family believe they have
'lost face' in the community and take their aggression out on the bride.
Furthermore, cultural, religious, and societal practices only add to the esca-
lation of the conflict by reinforcing old customs and traditions that have lost
their practical value in the world today. By continuing to associate a person
with a caste, by perceiving women as having less or no status as compared with
men, by forcing ancient customs, such as dowry, upon modem living conditions
and global standards, Indian society has further escalated the conflict towards a
conflict-spiral model.
In the conflict-spiral model, the escalation results from a vicious circle of
action and reaction.272 One party's contentious tactics "encourage a contentious
retaliatory or defensive reaction from the other party, which provokes further
contentious behavior from the first party, setting up a spiral" of ever increasing
hostile tactics.273 For example, the unrealistic and unsubstantiated perceptions of
women as subordinate to men and less valuable than men has create a cultured
of suicide, female infanticide, and feticide of women in India 4.2 " There is further
escalation of the conflict because of poor rationalization2 75 of the behavior, se-
lective information processing 276, and attribution errors277 all working to support
a self-fulfilling prophesy 278 of caste superiority and gender-based discrimination.
272. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 96.
273. Id.
274. See supra notes 13-58 and accompanying text.
275. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 155 (describing rationalization of behavior as the situation where
a party's negative about the other party views lead to hostile actions against the other party, which
the P1 rationalizes reaffirming views that gave rise to the initial hostile actions.).
276. Id. at 155-156 (citing Hopmann (1996) and describing selective information processing as
a situation in which after one party has already formed a negative opinion of the other party, P1 will
tends "pay attention to, search for, interpret, retain, and recall information in ways that confirm the
negative impression" already formed about P2. P1 specifically finds information to support the pre-
conceived ideas about the person.).
277. Id. at 159 (describing "attributional distortion" or causal inferences as another type of
selective information processing in which "information about Other that supports Party's private
hypotheses about Other tends to be attributed to dispositional causes, whereas information that is
discrepant with party's hypothesis tends to be attributed to situational causes." This means that
Party finds a negative trait and attributes it to a character flaw rather than just something that might
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These practices are simply a reflection of an escalation in the conflict be-
tween "the haves" and the "have nots", between those who must give a dowry
and those who demand it, and between those who have rights and those who do
not. In such a society, everyone is a perpetrator and everyone is a victim, an
equal participant. To become a victor instead of a victim, parties must move
towards a perceived stalemate. As someone once said, "Until all of us are free,
none of us are free." '279 As such the next section explores a theory towards a
perceive stalemate followed by some practical solutions to the conflict.
D. Towards a Theory of the True Conflict and a Perceived Stalemate
As Pruitt and Kim point out, eventually every escalated conflict comes to an
end, despite attempts to hold it in place.28° The escalated conflict may come to
an end in several ways including by adjudicating the matter, by one party over-
whelming the other party, by one party taking unilateral advantage of the other
party, by avoiding the conflict altogether or by negotiating a settlement.28 Pruitt
and Kim argue that negotiation and mediation usually grow out of reaching a
perceived stalemate.282 Currently, in our narrow issue, the conflict escalates to
the point where the bride loses her life for failure of providing sufficient dowry
or being unable to comply with extortion attempts for additional dowry. In a
sense, the conflict is resolved because the husband and his family have taken
full, unilateral advantage of the situation and overwhelmed the bride and her
family with further dowry demands. Even in the cases where such "attempted
dowry murders" have gone to court, the conflict has not been resolved in a man-
ner such that future similar conflicts will not occur. The option of having a
powerful third party (i.e., judge or arbitrator) impose a settlement has not been
happen given a particular set of circumstances. In any case, Party will have a negative view of Other
despite anything that Other might do to dispel the myth.).
278. Id. at 154 (self-fulfilling prophesy is "a phenomenon in which Party's beliefs and attitudes
about Other make Party behave in ways that elicit behavior from Other that reinforces these beliefs."
Therefore, because Party believes that Other is rude, worthless or an unhappy person, Party will
create situations such as provoking Other to cause other to be defensive or angry, thus reinforcing
Party's belief in Other's pre-determined character.).
279. Source of quote is varied. One source attributes this quote to Rosemary Brown, the first
black woman to be elected to political office in Canada.
280. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 171.
281. Id. at 172.
282. Id.
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effective to date, as evidenced by the lack of convictions for bride-burning as
compared with the continuing rise in bride-burning. 283
The optimal solution is for the parties to the conflict to come to the realiza-
tion that the costs or risks involved in escalating the conflict are no longer worth
it, thereby reaching a "high-water mark", which is the point of maximum con-
flict intensity, and where the parties will no longer escalate the conflict.2 4 This
allows for a stalemate situation to occur even if one party continues to use con-
tentious tactics for a while. 285 The importance of reaching a stage of perceived
stalemate is two-fold. First, the realization that the costs of escalation are un-
workable or unwise mean that the party's outlook has begun to change regarding
the nature of the conflict. This may be the result of the other party's refusal to
yield anymore or that it is too risky to escalate the conflict because of possible
future consequences. Second, the status of perceived stalemate allows for ripe
conditions to move into more productive problem-solving through negotiation or
mediation or a combination of dispute resolution processes. Therefore, the goal
with regards to the issue of bride-burning is to determine at which point each of
the active and passive parties will realize that the costs and risks of this practice
far outweigh the perceived benefits. It is fair to ask at this point: How many
bride-burnings will be enough? How many suicides, female infanticides, or
feticides are enough? How much dowry is enough to make parties realize that it
will never be enough? How much is a daughter or son actually worth? How
much of one's life savings is one willing to give away before it is too much?
Perhaps one brave young Indian woman has taken the time to answer some of
these question simply by saying "No" to the demands of further dowry by a
prospective groom.
286
The story of Nisha Sharma ("Nisha") is the story of one woman taking a
stand and realizing that the cost of participating in this deadly dance of dowry
weddings has far surpassed the benefits.287 In March 2003, Nisha met her pro-
spective groom, Munish Dayal ("Munish") and his family.288 As is a common
tactic, the Dayal family initially insisted on not taking a dowry.289 However,
when they subsequently learned about Nisha's former boyfriend, they used this
information and began blackmailing the Sharmas for expensive goods, using the
283. See supra notes 86-114 and accompanying text.
284. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 173.
285. Id.
286. Sabita Majid, "Guts in the Time of Dowry", June 1, 2003, available at
http://www.boloji.com/wfs/wfs l79.htm (last visited November 29, 2004); See also "Lisa Ling Inves-
tigates "Bride Burning ", The Oprah Winfrey Show, available at
http://www.oprah.com/tows/slide/200401/20040116/tows-slide_20040116_Ol.jhtml (last visited
November 29, 2004).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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"affair" as a bargaining chip to manipulate Nisha's family. 290 Nisha's father was
blackmailed into buying an expensive car and home appliances for the future
couple in addition to buying home appliances for Munish's elder brother, some-
thing for which Nisha's father had spent ten years earning and saving his
money.291 Later, closer to the wedding, the Dayals demanded $25,000 in cash.29 2
Until the day of the wedding, Nisha was completely unaware of the extent to
which her father was being harassed. 293 After nearly weeks of escalating har-
assment by the Dayals, Nisha's younger brother told her of the abuse suffered by
their father.294 On May 11, 2003, the day of Nisha Sharma's wedding, Nisha
immediately called her father, told him she would not be getting married, and
then called the police to report the Dayal family's unlawful conduct. 295 The
Dayals were arrested shortly thereafter. 296 Nisha Sharma said "no" to the abuse
perpetuated by the dowry system and saved her own life while serving as an
example to millions of young women.2 9 7
Given the current understanding of the conflict, it is clear that the true con-
flict resides at the four-way intersection between societal misperceptions of
women, the cultural practice of dowry as a means to survive or achieve social
status and material wealth, the lack of adequate legal enforcement of constitu-
tional guarantees of equality free from gender bias, and the imposition of indi-
vidualist-based processes to resolve collectivist-centered conflicts.
V. ALTERNATE AND EFFECTIVE MEANS TO STOP BRIDE-BURNING -
ESCORTING THE ELEPHANT OUT OF THE ROOM
Clearly, we are at a point in our collective consciousness and our place on
this planet where we know that bride-burning is wrong, that the practice of
dowry is not the most efficient way to gain individual wealth or raise group
290. Id.
291. Id. See also Christiane Amanpour, "For Love of Money", CBS News.com: 60 Minutes,
October 6, 2003, available at
http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2003/10/03/60minutes/main576466.shtml (last visited November
29, 2004).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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social status. We surely realize that neither domestic legislation nor interna-
tional customary law has managed to escort the proverbial "elephant" out of the
room. So where do we go from here? I propose the following options as a place
to start solving this problem from a different level of consciousness from which
it was created and with a greater passion and collective sense of genius than it
takes to simply pass another law or perform another operation to abort.
A. Just Say No!
The easiest and most effective way to deal with this issue is to say "No" to
additional demands of dowry or to participation in a dowry wedding at all. This
is precisely the action that Nisha Sharma took when she not only refused further
demands for dowry but called off her wedding and had her would-be groom
arrested for demanding a dowry, a violation under the Dowry Prohibition Act.298
In addition, a grass-roots organization, the Association for India's Devel-
opment ("A.I.D") sponsors a "Campaign Against Dowry", where one can make
a personal, community, or organizational pledge never to give or take a
dowry. 299
Saying "no" is a powerful step in realizing one's own rights and taking re-
sponsibility for one's own life as well as having a say in one's own future. It
also inspires others in ways that the law cannot, by making a personal and em-
powering statement of self-worth. For example, two women followed in the
footsteps of Nisha Sharma's courageous stance by calling off their wedding.3° °
Saying "No!" is not avoiding the problem by not doing anything or withdraw-
ing.3 °' Saying "No!" is an active, affirmative response towards reclaiming one's
own life as well as recognizing one's own self-worth when relating to those who
wish to denigrate it.
While saying "No" is self-empowering, it can have its disadvantages. For
example, as in Nisha Sharma's case, it did not relieve her parents from the obli-
298. Id. (Note however, that despite this one courageous act and an advanced engineering, even
Nisha Sharma is fully ingrained in the dowry culture and admits that she would allow her parents to
chose the course of her life and would pay dowry again if that is what was required. But her step is a
step in the right direction and it is an individual, responsible step).
299. "Campaign Against Dowry", Association for India's Development, available at
http://www.aidindia.org/nodowry/index.shtml (last visited November 29, 2004).
300. Majid, supra note 286.
301. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 6-7 (defining the strategy of "avoiding" as "not engaging in the
conflict by inaction or withdrawal." Inaction is "doing nothing about the conflict." Withdrawal is
"abandoning the conflict", such as walking out of the door. Avoiding is a passive strategy.). In this
case, saying "no" to dowry is not avoiding the conflict, but recognizing that one plays a part in the
conflict and choosing, actively, how one will or will not participate. It is also active participation
because the other party is fully aware of what choice one is making. It may be closer to the strategy
of contending than avoiding.
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gation of finding another groom for Nisha.3 2 In addition, even after this brush
with the extortion and violence associated with dowry, Nisha, perhaps out of a
sense of obligation, entrenched traditions, or fear for her and her family's future,
still trusts her family and the traditions of her culture, including dowry wed-
dings.3°3 However, she has taken a step towards the future and that step is one
that cannot be taken away from Nisha Sharma or those who follow her example.
B. Going Below the Line
The moment the conflict has reached a state of perceived stalemate is the
optimal time to introduce negotiation or mediation. 3' At this point, the parties
have a different outlook as a result of realizing that the costs and risks far out-
weigh the benefits of continuing the conflict.305 Mediation offers several advan-
tages over negotiation because it is a consensual, collaborative, interest-based
process.3°6 Because mediation looks at the interests and needs of the parties
rather than what rights the party has or does not have, it is an informal, compas-
sionate dialogue. The process of mediation goes "below the line" to determine
what values, interests, and aspirations drive a person's behavior so as to deter-
mine ways to address these aspirations without resorting to escalated contentious
tactics.3°7
Mediation can be used at any point during the conflict. As long as the me-
diator is well-respected and unbiased, parties will be able to discuss their differ-
ences and come to an agreement without legal intervention. While the legal
system is available, in the situation of bride-burning, mediating the conflict may
302. Majid, supra note 286 (reporting that Nisha's parents found Dayal as part of an arranged
marriage after Nisha had an argument with a former boyfriend who was to be the previous intended
groom). See also, Ehtasham Khan, "Anti-dowry icon, Nisha Sharma, ties the knot", November 19,
2003, available at http://www.rediff.com/news/20O3/nov/19delhi.htm (last visited November 29,
2004)(reporting on Nisha Sharma's November wedding to a local that was arranged via a mutual
friend. The engagement happened in September 2003, only three months after her rise to fame as an
anti-dowry icon.).
303. Id. (reporting that despite the mess with the Dayal family, "Nisha keeps repeating: 'I'll do
whatever my parents/father want me to."' Further, Nisha states that she would be willing to have her
parents give dowry in the future because "'[t]omorrow, if we are thrown out of our marriages, at
least we would have these valuable things,' she says, echoing the sentiment rightly or wrongly
shared by many young women today.").
304. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 172-73.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 232-35.
307. Id. at 199 (discussing the importance of analyzing underlying interests as a means to
problem-solving and reconciliation.).
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have benefit of further de-escalating tensions that the legal system has been
unable to accomplish at this time.
One way to fully take advantage of mediation is to make it a mandatory step
once a complaint has been filed with the courts. Because India's judicial system
today is known for lax enforcement of dowry prohibition acts, it would be bene-
ficial to recommend mandatory mediation if a complaint is filed. This way, the
preliminary, pre-trial investigation can be done with the support of a third-party
neutral who is trained to look at the problem from an interest-based perspective
rather than purely a rights-based perspective. In a collectivist society such as
India, this approach will likely be well received and more effective.
Using mediation is similar to the current use of family counseling center
cells.3 °8 Whereas the counseling cells are government-sponsored, mediation
would be done by a non-governmental neutral that is familiar with the emo-
tional, psychological, and physical issues surrounding dowry marriages and their
effects on women and society. In addition, unlike the family counseling centers,
mediation would allow both men and women to share their issues instead of
reframing the problem as one of women adjusting to a new marriage. Men also
would likely welcome the opportunity to discuss how dowry affects them once
there is reassurance of confidentiality and respect for all views. Once parties
understand the process and benefits of mediation, they will see its value and take
advantage of the process as a means to reframe the issue start to really find a
viable, workable solution. Mediation is also advantageous because it is one way
that parties can work close to the system, respecting its boundaries, while striv-
ing to make small, incremental changes.
C. Working Within the Existing System
Until more effective measures are in place, the only effective avenue that
parties have is through enforcement via existing domestic legislation.3 °9 With
this in mind, I argue that if the practice of dowry is to continue, then dowry ne-
gotiations should take place as any other type of contract negotiations, with full
legal representation for both parties, enforceable under India's contract law. It is
clear that most scholars and critics regard dowry marriages as a negotiation of
sorts where there is an agreement for marriage that is consummated via the ex-
change of consideration in the form of money and/or property.3" ° Given this
consensus of opinion, the dowry negotiations should take place between the
relevant parties with full legal representation. This representation can be in the
form of local attorneys, pro bono attorneys, a legal aid society, or a qualified
308. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 83-107 and accompanying text.
310. Pardee, supra note 12 at 498; Shah, supra note 9, at 214; Nangia, supra note 15, at 644.
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mediator. However, the important point is that it should be fairly negotiated,
memorialized in writing, and enforceable in court. In addition, any additional
demands for dowry should be considered as modifications to this contract, sub-
ject to all the formal and informal contract re-negotiation principles. If Indian
society will continue to treat people as commodities and their children as com-
modities that are bought and sold in exchange for a "glimpse of economic para-
dise", then why not do this under common law contract principles known by the
legal community and the justice system? At least in this manner, the transac-
tions are documented, the results measured, and parties are held accountable for
them. It might also create an incentive for people to realize how much their
daughters are truly worth and that they are, indeed, priceless - as are their sons.
A written contract for marriage is not so far from the oral contract that cur-
rently takes place. The key difference is that the parties do not consciously real-
ize that they are treating their sons and daughters as commodities in as much as
they would treat a cow or an expensive car. Even if the parents are fully aware
of their actions, it is almost entrenched unconscious actions disguised as custom,
culture, necessity, or 'the way things have always been'. By forcing their words
to be written down, perhaps all parties will have an 'awakening' of sorts in order
to make a conscious paradigm shift towards realizing the grave present and fu-
ture consequences of their actions. At worst, there may be less arranged mar-
riages if parties are forced to memorialize them and be subject to enforcement.
Pre-marriage contracts can also create some sense of interest and security for the
bride in the future. At best, the issue of dowry marriage will come under a mi-
croscopic spotlight for all to see.
Another means to work within the current system is to educate all persons
on their legal and ethical obligations as well as their rights under domestic and
international law. It is incumbent upon parents and educators to teach children
of their obligations under the law and to encourage lawful and peaceful resolu-
tion of conflict at all levels. In addition, the legislature, the judiciary, and law
enforcement should be required to attend domestic violence training to better
understand the insidious nature of dowry and dowry-related deaths so as to bet-
ter enforce the law. Domestic violence education and the impact of dowry
should also be part of local religious, cultural and community training. Today it
is lax enforcement of the law that creates the primary roadblock to preventing
bride-burning partly because law enforcement officials cannot empathize with
the victims. Education is knowledge and knowledge is power in fully enforcing
existing laws and solving this heinous crime of bride burning.
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D. Working Around The Existing System
The optimal way for resolving the conflict is to reach a state of perceived
stalemate such that parties are able to discuss and define integrative solutions to
the conflict. Integrative solutions are those which move from the demands of
either party to novel, workable alternatives developed through creativity and
imagination that takes into account the interests of all parties in the conflict.3"
One option to resolving the issue of bride-burning is to expand the pie. Ex-
panding the pie is especially helpful when the root of the conflict is resource
shortage and requires creative means for increasing the available resources." 2
For example, if the proposed groom and his family demand a high dowry be-
cause of a perceived shortage of family wealth, the bride's family can have a
discussion with the future in-laws that is centered around the extent to which the
proposed family wants to achieve a measured goal of family wealth. In addi-
tion, the bride and her family can relay their own perceived resource shortages
and future goals. Together, they may be able to creatively find a way to use
their current resources to mutually benefit each other by. For example, they can
develop a partnership to sell certain goods or services with a percentage of prof-
its serving as 'dowry' for the marriage or toward meeting each party's future
goals. In this way, the families work together towards a common goal, but util-
ize means that respect each party's perceived resource shortages and strengths.
Expanding the pie can also be used by the Indian government in curbing
dowry-related violence, such as bride-burning. For example, if the govern-
ment's main reason for the current lack of enforcing anti-dowry legislation is
scarcity of policemen and adequate judicial funding to prosecute cases, they
could expand the pie by signing and ratifying the United Nations Optional Pro-
tocols to several international human rights treaties.3"3 By doing so, the gov-
ernment expands the quantity and quality of their enforcement mechanisms by
partnering with other domestic non-governmental entities as well as interna-
tional relief agencies to curb the violent results of dowry practice. Some might
argue that this would mean admitting fault or defeat. On the contrary, the oppo-
311. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 192-93 (discussing the benefits of integrative solutions and the
five types of integrative solutions including: 1) expanding the pie; 2) nonspecific compensation; 3)
logrolling; 4) cost cutting; and 5) bridging).
312. Id. at 194-95 (discussing the nature of expanding the pie and the information requirements
necessary to devise an appropriate integrative solution as well as reframing the issue.). Note that
while this type of integrative solution is useful for actual resource shortages, this technique can also
be used in cases where there is a perceived shortage of resources as in the case of the underlying
reasons why dowry is still practiced today.
313. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that while India has
ratified the various international human rights treaties, they have not signed nor ratified the Optional
Protocols to those treaties, allowing for individual complaints to be filed with the respective UN
agency.).
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site is true. By taking such a bold and creative step, the government would be a
shining beacon to all similar countries in respecting the human rights of its citi-
zens, working within an international forum, and demonstrating their commit-
ment to effectively abolishing dowry practice and dowry-related violence, such
as bride-burning. Through this mechanism, India gains the support and respect
of its own citizens and the citizens of the global community.
A second option for resolving the issue of bride-burning is via bridging.
Bridging is another integrative solution technique in which neither party
achieves its initial demands, but both parties define new options that satisfy each
party's most important underlying interests first.3"4 To obtain an integrative
solution via bridging, there must be an understanding of each party's underlying
interests and the priority among these interests.315 Such an understanding of
underlying interests can be obtained between the parties or, preferably, with the
help of an external, neutral mediator. By employing techniques such as active
listening, role reversal, empathizing, or "listening with the third ear",3 16 conflict-
ing parties can come to a more clear understanding of each others' priority of
interests and unstated goals.
For example, proposed dowry negotiations can be conducted with the help
of a qualified mediator. The mediator can help both parties and their respective
families determine each party's underlying interests and the priority among
those interests." 7 By doing so, each party can then determine which of their
prioritized interests have greater value, whether there are mutually acceptable
alternatives, or which lower priority interests will lose to higher priority inter-
ests."' Again, this process can provide a way to have dialogue between the
parties with the hope that each party begins to see the other as having needs and
interests by engaging in a more humane dialogue about the transaction that will
314. Pruitt, supra note 174, at 197-198 (discussing bridging as an integrative solution, informa-
tion requirements for bridging, and a model for using this technique.). The importance of bridging
in this conflict cannot be underestimated because the conflict resides at levels below the legal and
economic solutions already proposed. By using active listening techniques and clearly identifying
each party's underlying interests, it is possible that parties will begin to see the potential bride,
groom, and each other as humans connected by a common goal rather than "non-entities" as happens
in conflicts between ingroups and outgroups.
315. Id. at 198.
316. Id. at 199 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of active listening, role reversal,
empathizing, and "listening with the third year".).
317. Id. at 201 (demonstrating how to identify each party's underlying interests and the priority
among these interests. The effect of doing so is for each side to see that polar opposite interests are
not necessarily a point of conflict and that there is an integrative solution among these interests.).
318. Id. at 198.
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take place between the parties. Bridging is powerful to the extent that parties
may realize that asking for dowry or demanding additional dowry is morally
unethical and places their future neighbor, friend, or community in a position of
weakness rather than creating a community of strength and cooperation. Today,
many dowry negotiations appear to take place in a vacuum without any concern
for the other party. By simply engaging the other side in dialogue, each party
will have a voice in a dowry system which seeks only to "check-mate" its play-
ers.
Given the entrenched nature of the caste system in India, the misperceptions
of women, and the international community's recognition of state sovereignty,
integrative solutions driven by each party's need to creatively and cooperatively
resolve the dilemma of bride-burning may be the first line of defense. Indeed,
integrative solutions may be the only means by which to begin healing the
broader violations of human rights caused by practices such as bride-burning.
VI. CONCLUSION - A CALL TO ACTION, A CHANCE FOR HEALING
By official statistics, seventeen women (17) are victims of bride-burning
every day in India.319 By unofficial statistics, sixty-eight (68) women die of
bride-burning or dowry-related deaths every day.32 In addition, about 2000
dowry-related suicides are reported every year.3 21 Female infanticide and feti-
cide as a result of dowry are on the rise to the tune of millions of women miss-
ing from the Indian society per year.322
This is no longer an "issue" or an "incident" as law enforcement officials in
India seem to think. We are now at a point where this is an epidemic, a system-
atic, albeit measured, gendercide of Indian women. In every sense of the word,
bride-burning is a stain on the consciousness of the Indian community, a stain on
the viability of that nation and a stain on our collective human consciousness,323
unless we are bold enough to say "Stop"!
319. "Campaign Against Dowry", supra note 299.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See also David Luban, The Romance of the Nation-State, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 392, 397(1980)(stating "[W]hen murders, tortures ... go unchecked, more so when their perpetrators (the
worst people in the world) are treated as if they are legitimate, the common humanity of all of us is
stained.").
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